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CHAPTER 3 
Contracts and Commercial Law 
JAMES STEVEN ROGERS* 
§ 3.1 Reformation of Usurious Loans. In Begelfer v. Najarian 1 the 
Supreme Judicial Court considered for the first time problems presented by 
Massachusetts' unique criminal usury statute. 2 While the Court's decision 
resolves a number of significant interpretive problems concerning the 
statute, the decision is in some respects unsatisfying. Yet it must be ad-
mitted that the source of the problem lies principally in the peculiarity of the 
Massachusetts provision. 
Since 1867 Massachusetts has had no generally applicable usury statute, 3 
although a variety of statutes do impose maximum interest rates on specific 
types of loans. 4 In 1970 the General Court, acting upon the recommenda-
tion of the Governor, enacted a criminal usury statute, section 49 of chapter 
271. 5 The scant legislative history suggests that the measure was adopted in 
order to provide a mechanism for the prosecution of loansharks. 6 Section 
49(a) of chapter 271 provides that contracting for or receiving interest and 
expenses at a rate in excess of 200Jo per year is a criminal offense punishable 
• JAMES STEVEN ROGERS is an Assistant Professor of Law at Boston College Law 
School. 
§ 3.1 ' 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1721, 409 N.E.2d 167. 
Four months before the Supreme Judicial Court's decision in Bege/fer, the Massachusetts 
Appeals Court rendered a decision dealing with similar issues. Beach Assoc. Inc. v. Fauser, 
1980 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 525, 401 N.E.2d 858. The two cases adopt essentially the same 
approach to the problem of the effect of the criminal usury statute in civil litigation. In 
Begeljer the Supreme Judicial Court adopted much of the reasoning of the Appeals Court in 
Beach Assoc. See 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1730-31, 409 N.E.2d at 174-75. 
' G.L. c. 271, § 49. Many other jurisdictions have adopted criminal usury statutes. For 
discussion of such statutes, and other approaches to the problems of loansharking, see 
Goldstock & Coenen, Controlling the Contemporary Loanshark: The Law of Illicit Lending 
and the Problem of Witness Fear, 65 CoRNELL L. REv. 131 (1980). The feature of the 
Massachusetts provision which is the source of many of the interpretive difficulties, section 
49(d) of Chapter 271 which provides that the statute does not apply to lenders who register with 
the Attorney General, appears to be unique. 
' 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1725, 409 N.E.2d at 170. 
• E.g., G.L. c. 140, § 73 (pawnbrokers); G.L. c. 140, § 90A (small home mortgage loans); 
G.L. c. 140, § 100 (small loan businesses); G.L. c. 255B, § 14 (retail installment sales of motor 
vehicles); G.L. c. 255D, § 11 (retail installment sales). 
' Acts of 1970, c. 826, codified as G.L. c. 271, § 49. 
• The bill which became G.L. c. 271, § 49 was proposed by Governor Sargent as part of a 
1
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by fine and imprisonment. 7 Section 49(d), however, provides that the 
statute shall not apply to any person who files a notification with the At-
torney General of his intention to enter into a loan which would otherwise 
violate section 49(a) and maintains records of the transaction. 8 Section 49(c) 
provides that upon the petition of the borrower any loan on which the in-
terest and expense charges exceed 20% "may be declared void" by the 
Supreme Judicial Court or the Superior Court. 9 
Begeljer v. Najarian 10 was an action brought by borrowers under section 
49(c) seeking to have their loans declared void. Plaintiffs were developers 
who had raised funds for a real estate project by borrowing from a variety 
of persons, including the defendant Najarian, a pharmacist. 11 The prom-
issory note signed by the plaintiffs provided for monthly payments of prin-
cipal and interest, with interest at the rate of 150Jo, later raised to 17%. 12 
The note also provided for default charges on late payments of up to 15% 
of the overdue installment and made the borrower liable for the lender's at-
torneys' fees in collection proceedings. 13 The parties made no filing with the 
Attorney General. After defaulting on the note, plaintiffs brought suit 
under section 49(c) seeking a declaration that the loan was void. 14 On appeal 
from a grant of summary judgment for defendant, the Supreme Judicial 
Court held that default charges and attorneys' fees were to be included in 
the computation of the interest and expense charges on the loan and that the 
loan therefore violated the criminal usury statute. 15 The Court ruled, 
however, that the language of section 49(c) confers discretion upon the 
courts to fashion appropriate equitable remedies for violations of the 
statute, rejecting the contention that any loan found to violate the ~tatute 
must be declared void in toto. 16 Acting on this equitable remedy theory, the 
Court refused to enforce the default charge provision and directed that 
reasonable attorneys' fees should be recomputed such that the lenders' total 
recovery on the loan would not exceed 20%. 17 
package of bills directed at facilitating prosecution of organized crime. Message of the Gover-
nor, 1970 House Doc. No. 5439. 
' G.L. c. 271, § 49(a). 
• G.L. c. 271, § 49(d). As initially proposed by the Governor the bill did not include an ex-
emption for persons who register with the Attorney General. 1970 House Doc. No. 5439, App. 
F. The exemption now found in section 49(d) was added by the House Committee on Banks 
and Banking. 1970 House Doc. No. 5931. 
' G.L. c. 271, § 49(c). 
•• 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh, 1721, 409 N.E.2d 167. 
" Id. at 1723, 409 N.E.2d at 170. 
" /d. at 1724, 409 N.E.2d at 170. 
"Id. 
•• /d. at 1722, 409 N.E.2d at 169-170. 
" Id. at 1725~29, 1733 n.16, 409 N.E.2d at 171-73, 175 n.16. 
" /d. at 1730-33, 409 N.E.2d at 173-75. 
11 /d. at 1733 & n.l6, 409 N.E.2d at 175 & n.16. 
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Justice Abrams' opinion for the unanimous Court considered first 
whether the default charge should be included in the 200Jo ceiling on interest 
and expenses. The specific language of section 49(a) is as follows: 
Whoever in exchange for either a loan of money or other property 
knowingly contracts for, charges, takes or receives, directly or in-
directly, interest and expenses the aggregate of which exceeds an 
amount greater than twenty per centum per annum upon the sum 
loaned or the equivalent rate for a longer or shorter period, shall be 
guilty of criminal usury .... For the purposes of this section the 
amount to be paid upon any loan for interest or expenses shall include 
all sums paid or to be paid by or on behalf of the borrower for in-
terest, brokerage, recording fees, commissions, services, extention of 
loan, forbearance to enforce payment, and all other sums charged 
against or paid or to be paid by the borrower for making or securing 
directly or indirectly the loan . . . ! 8 
The Court concluded that a default charge falls within the statutory 
definition of "interest and expenses." 19 The Court rested its conclusion on 
the "all inclusive language used by the legislature"20 and the failure of the 
legislature to provide specifically for the treatment of default charges, as it 
had done in certain other interest regulation statutes. 21 
Although the principal issue in Begelfer concerning the meaning of the 
" G.L. c. 271, § 49(a). 
" 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1726, 409 N.E.2d at 171. 
,. /d. 
" /d. (citing G.L. c. 255B, §§ 11, 20 (Retail Installment Sales of Motor Vehicles Act); G.L. 
c. 2550, § 9C (Retail Installment Sales and Services Act)). 
The Court also referred to several other statutes which provide inferential support for the 
conclusion that default charges are included within the definition of interest and expenses in 
the criminal usury statute. The Small Loans Act, G.L. c. 140, §§ 96-114B, provides for the 
licensing and regulation of persons in the business of making small loans who charge interest 
and expenses in excess of 120Jo. The coverage provision of the Small Loans Act, id. § 96, con-
tains a definition of interest and expenses identical to that in the criminal usury statute. The 
Court cited the case of Greenleaf Fin. Co. v. Small Loans Regulatory Bd., 1979 Mass. Adv. 
Sh. 356, 363, 358 N.E.2d 1364, 1369, upholding a Small Loans Regulatory Board rate order 
which included a provision regulating late charges. The Small Loan Regulatory Board's rate-
making authority is based on section 100 of chapter 140 of the General Laws, which empowers 
the Board to establish "a maximum rate of charge" for loans subject to the act. Thus, assum-
ing that the term "rate of charge" in section 100 of chapter 140 of the General Laws is to be 
read as covering only the items in the definition of "interest and expenses" in section 96, 
Greenleaf provides support for the inclusion of default charges within the term "interest and 
expenses" in section 49 of chapter 271. 
The Court also referred to section 114A of chapter 140 which exempts banks from the Small 
Loans Act but limits the interest and expenses charged by banks on loans which would other-
wise be covered by the Act to the rates established pursuant to section 100. Section 114A con-
tains a provision expressly including default charges in the computation of permissible interest 
and expenses. 
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term "interest and expenses" involved the default charge, the Court noted 
in a footnote that the defendants' request for enforcement of all provisions 
of the note also raised the issue of the treatment of attorneys' fees. 22 The 
Court stated that "As we read § 49, the legislature has determined that an 
unregistered lender may not recover in excess of twenty per cent for a loan. 
The twenty per cent must cover all the interest and expenses including the 
expenses of services." 23 Thus, the Court concluded that attorneys' fees for 
collection services upon default are to be included in the computation of the 
permissible "interest and expenses" under section 49(a). 24 
Having concluded that the default charge and attorneys' fees provisions 
of the note caused the loan involved in Begeljer to violate the criminal usury 
statute, the Court turned to the matter of the remedy available to the bor-
rower. Section 49(c) of the statute provides that a loan which violates sec-
tion 49(a) "may be declared void" upon a petition in equity brought by the 
borrower. 25 Plaintiffs argued that this language requires that any loan made 
in violation of the statute be declared void in total, relieving plaintiffs of 
any obligation for the payment of interest or repayment of principal. 26 
Justice Abrams rejected this contention and concluded that "the permissive 
language of § 49(c) ... empower[s] a court to utilize its full range of 
equitable powers, including cancellation, in order to reach an appropriate 
result in each case. ' 027 Noting that voiding the loan in its entirety would pro-
duce an "undeserved windfall to the plaintiffs, " 28 the Court concluded that 
the appropriate remedy was to reform the loan contract to comply with the 
200Jo limitation on interest and expenses. 29 Thus, the Court refused to en-
force the default charge provision of the note and directed that the assess-
ment of attorneys' fees be recomputed so that the lenders' total recovery on 
the loan would not exceed 20%. 30 
" 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1733 n.16, 409 N.E.2d at 175 n.16. 
" /d. 
24 /d. 
" G.L. c. 271, § 49(a). 
" 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1730 & n.l3, 409 N.E.2d at 173 & n.l3. 
" /d. at 1730, 409 N.E.2d at 173. 
" Id. at 1733, 409 N.E.2d at 175. 
" /d. 
•• /d. at 1733 & n.16, 409 N.E.2d at 175 & n.16. In granting reformation as a remedy for 
violations of section 49, the Court followed the approach adopted by the Appeals Court in 
Beach Assoc. Inc. v. Fauser, 1980 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 525, 401 N.E.2d 858. In Beach 
Assoc., however, the Appeals Court suggested that an alternative equitable basis for reforma-
tion was available on the particular facts involved. Like Begelfer, Beach Assoc. involved loans 
by investors for a real estate development project. Plaintiffs and defendants, all apparently ex-
perienced businessmen, negotiated a loan bearing interest at 1 Y2 Ofo per month and an addi-
tional charge denominated a "finders fee" of Y2% per month. The defendant investors, 
residents of New York, placed the money in escrow pending receipt of advice from 
Massachusetts counsel on the legality of the interest rate. After receiving erroneous advice that 
4
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As an alternative basis of its decision with respect to the default charge, 
the Court noted that the default charge provision might be viewed as a liq-
uidated damage provision for breach of the repayment provision of the 
note. 31 Such a liquidated damage provision could be held unenforceable if it 
is " 'so disproportionate to the damages caused . . . by the . . . breach of 
the agreement that it amounts to a penalty.' " 32 
The inclusion of default charges and attorneys' fees within the coverage 
of the usury statute highlights the unique nature of the Massachusetts pro vi-
sion. Justice Abrams acknowledged that the courts of most American 
jurisdictions have excluded default charges from the computation of in-
terest for purposes of usury statutes, on the theory that the borrower may 
avoid the charge by paying the loan when due. 33 Attorneys' fees incurred by 
the lender in connection with collection of the loan are also generally ex-
cluded from the coverage of usury laws. 34 The ruling in Begeljer that both 
default charges and attorneys' fees for collection fall within the purview of 
the Massachusetts criminal usury statue suggests that the Court will inter-
pret the statue as covering charges of any nature imposed in connection with 
a lending transaction. These would include charges generally considered to 
fall within usury laws, such as points, discounts, compensating balances, 
and fees not related to specific services, such as origination fees and service 
charges.B They might also include, however, a variety of charges which 
might be excluded from the scope of the usury laws of other jurisdictions, 
such as brokers' and finders' fees, commitment fees, contingent interest, 
credit life or disability insurance premiums, and reimbursement of actual 
the loan terms were lawful, defendants disbursed the funds. No filing was made with the At-
torney General under § 49(d). Plaintiffs defaulted on the loan and brought suit under § 49(c) 
seeking to have the loans declared void. On these facts the Appeals Court ruled that the loan 
could be reformed on the basis of the equitable doctrine that "[r)eformation is available to par-
ties where there has been a mutual mistake which is material to the instrument and where no 
rights of third persons are affected.'' The court concluded that ''it was known by all the parties 
that the defendants intended to charge a legal rate of interest.'' Since the parties entered into 
the transaction "in the mistaken belief that the interest rate was proper," it was appropriate 
for the court to reform the interest provision of the note to the lawful rate of 2007o. This ap-
proach of reformation for mistake rests on a peculiar factual assumption. The Appeals Court's 
approach seems to assume that had the parties received correct advice concerning the 
Massachusetts statute, they would have charged interest at 20% per annum. Surely, though, 
had the parties understood the Massachusetts law they would have charged just the rate they 
had previously negotiated, 24%, and made a filing with the Attorney General under § 49(d). 
" 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1729-30, 409 N.E.2d at 173 . 
. , /d. at 1729, 409 N.E.2d at 173 (quoting Manganro Drywall, Inc. v. Penn-Simon Constr. 
Co., 357 Mass. 653, 658, 260 N.E.2d 182, 185 (1970)). 
" /d. at 1728, 409 N.E.2d 172. 
"E.g., Crowder v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 567 S.W.2d 550, 554 (Tex. Civ. App. 
1978). 
" See generally PRACTICING L V TNSTITUTE, USURY LAWS AND MODERN BUSINESS TRANSAC· 
TIONS (1979). 
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expenses incurred by the lender such as recording costs, escrow fees, title in-
surance premiums and the like. 36 
The Court suggested, however, that the broad scope of the definition of 
interest and expenses in the Massachusetts criminal usury statute should not 
prove problematic for lenders since a lender can avoid the application of the 
statute by registering with the Attorney General. 37 In view of this avenue of 
escape from the statute, the Court evidently will not look with favor on 
arguments for a narrow construction of the coverage of the statute. 
Although the exemption for lenders who have registered with the Attorney 
General does provide an easy means for the careful and well-advised lender 
to avoid any problems with the criminal usury statute, the statute is un-
doubtedly a trap for the unwary-and becomes a more serious trap the 
more broadly it is construed. 
Nonetheless, the language of section 49(a) is hardly susceptible to the sort 
of limiting construction often given to other usury provisions. In construing 
usury provisions courts have often noted that the statutes are intended to 
regulate interest charges in the sense of compensation for the use of money. 
Thus, charges for other specific services provided or expenses incurred in 
connection with the loan, such as recording fees, title insurance premiums, 
attorneys' fees, and the like, may be excluded from computation of 
regulated "interest" charges. 38 The Massachusetts provision, however, ex-
pressly includes at least some categories of reimbursement of the lender's 
actual incidental expenses, e.g., "brokerage, recording fees, commissions, 
services. " 39 Thus, the argument that a distinction should be drawn between 
charges for the use of money and charges for incidental services or expenses 
seem foreclosed by the text of the Massachusetts provision. 
The Begeljer Court's conclusion that default charges fall within the scope 
of section 49(a) is difficult to resist. In addition to the general language of 
the statute covering ''all other sums charged against ... the borrower,'' the 
statute explicitly covers charges for "forebearance to enforce payment" 
which might well be taken to cover default charges. 40 The inclusion of at-
torneys' fees for collection is somewhat less defensible. Although the statute 
probably must be read to cover attorneys' fees incurred in connection with 
the negotiation and documentation ofthe loan, it is less clear that attorneys' 
fees for collection of the loan upon default can be considered charges "for 
making or securing ... the loan. " 41 In addition, the inclusion of attorneys' 
"ld. 
" 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1129, 409 N.E.2d at 173. 
" See Cambridge Dev. Co. v. U.S. Financial, 11 Cal. App. 3d 1025, 90 Cal. Rptr. 333 
(1970). 
" O.L. c. 271, § 49(a). 
•• Id. 
•• Id. 
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fees for collection presents substantial planning problems in that it may be 
impossible at the time the loan is made to predict the amount of attorneys' 
fees for collection. How, then, is the lender to determine whether the total 
interest and expense charges may exceed 200Jo? 42 The moral seems to be that 
a filing with the Attorney General under section 49(d) should be made in 
connection with virtually any loan not otherwise exempt. 
The Begeljer Court's treatment of the issue of the remedy for violations 
of the criminal usury statute is somewhat troublesome. The Court's rejec-
tion of the interpretation of section 49 which would require that any loan 
found to violate the statute be declared void seems entirely appropriate in 
view of the permissive language of the statute and the windfall which the 
borrower would receive if that argument were accepted. The Court may, 
however, have given insufficient consideration to the contrary view that a 
violation of section 49 may not require any remedy in a civil suit. 
Notwithstanding the Court's language concerning equitable discretion in 
fashioning remedies to fit the particular circumstances of each case, 43 it is 
probably realistic to read the case as standing for the proposition that 
whenever a violation of section 49 is shown, the courts should, at the 
minimum, reform the contract to reduce the total interest and expenses to 
200Jo. The key to the Court's conclusion that such reformation is ap-
propriate is the assuption that the criminal usury statute embodies a public 
policy that lenders who have not registered with the Attorney General under 
section 49(d) may not charge interest and expenses in excess of 20%. That 
assumption, however, may well be questioned. 
The Court. noted that by virtue of another provision of the general laws, 44 
parties may lawfully contract for any rate of interest, except as otherwise 
provided .in certain specific regulatory acts. 45 This general absence of a 
usury proscription is modified by section 49 to the extent that persons who 
wish to charge interest and expenses of more than 20% are required to 
42 The problem is made even more acute by the absence in the statute of any principles for 
determining how one-shot charges are to be spread over the term of the loan. Consider, for ex-
ample, a one year loan of $1000 with interest at 1911Jo on the $1000 principal and initial charges 
for recording fees or the like of $20. The interest expense is $190. If the $20 charge is con-
sidered as reducing the principal amount loaned to $980 the effective rate is $190 divided by 
$980, or 19.3911Jo. If, however the $20 initial charge is added to the $190 interest charge and 
considered as interest and expense charged on the $1000 principal amount, the effective rate, 
$210 divided by $1000, is 2111Jo. Attorneys' fees for collection are even more problematic. Con-
sider a demand loan of $1000 with interest at 611Jo per annum, and suppose that attorneys' fees 
for collection if the borrower defaults are $100. If the borrower defaults after one year, the 
total interest and expense charge is $160, or an effective annual rate of 1611Jo. If the borrower 
defaults after one month, the total interest and expense charge for the one month period is 
$105, or an effective annual rate of 12611Jo. 
•• 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1732-33, 409 N.E.2d at 175. 
•• G.L. c. 107, § 3. 
•• 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1727, 409 N.E.2d at 171-72. 
7
Rogers: Chapter 3: Contracts and Commercial Law
Published by Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School, 1980
76 1980 ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETIS LAW § 3.1 
register with the Attorney General. The key to the Begeljer Court's ruling 
on remedies for violation of section 49lies in the identification of the policy 
embodied in the criminal usury statute. The Court viewed section 49 as em-
bodying the policy that lenders not registered with the Attorney General 
may not charge more than 200Jo interest. 46 On that interpretation of the 
statute, the Court's conclusion with respect to the remedy follows easily: the 
defendants in Begeljer were persons not registered with the Attorney 
General and hence may not charge more than 20%. Reformation of the in-
terest and expense charges to 20% is a remedy aptly designed to implement 
this policy. 
It is, however, far from clear that the statute can plausibly be read to em-
body this policy. If the legislature were genuinely concerned with excessive 
interest charges, it is difficult to see what difference it would make whether 
the lender has filed a notification with the Attorney General. Unlike some 
of the other interest limitation statutes, 47 the criminal usury statute does not 
establish any mechanism for the supervision or regulation of the practices 
of lenders who file notices under section 49(d). Apparently the section 49(d) 
notices are simply filed and forgotten. Such a statute is a most peculiar 
response to concern over excessive interest charges. Apparently, the 
malicious usurer is transfigured into an honorable man by the simple expe-
dient of filing a piece of paper with the Attorney General's office. Even a 
lawyer should be puzzled by a rule which imputes such mystical powers to a 
document. 
Rather than embodying a policy that lenders who do not register may not 
charge interest in excess of 20% per annum, the criminal usury provision 
should be seen as embodying the very different policy that those lenders 
who do charge more than 20% interest must register with the Attorney 
General. It must be borne in mind that section 49 is a criminal statute 
adopted as part of a package of measures designed to facilitate the prosecu-
tion of organized crime-specifically loansharking operations. 48 Were one 
inclined to impute a remarkable degree of naivete to the legislature, the 
criminal usury statute might be viewed as a mechanism designed to bring to 
the Attorney General's attention those persons whose activities may war-
rant further investigation and perhaps prosecution under other criminal 
provisions directed at loansharking. However, those engaged in otherwise 
unlawful loansharking operations are unlikely to be the sort of law-abiding 
folk who comply with registration provisions. Thus, the more plausible 
view of section 49 is that it rests on the assumption that loansharks are likely 
•• /d., at 1729,409 N.E.2d at 173 ("In sum, the legislature has determined, as it may, that a 
lender who does not comply with the requirements of§ 49 may not charge interest and expenses 
in excess of twenty percent a year.") 
47 See statutes cited in note 4 supra. 
•• Note 6 supra. 
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to charge more than 200Jo interest, and are unlikely to register with the At-
torney General. Hence, persons who, by means other than section 49, come 
to the attention of prosecutors as being engaged in genuine loansharking 
operations-charging outrageous interest and enforcing their loans through 
violence and threats of violence-will be subject to prosecution under a 
statute which obviates some of the difficulties often encountered in the 
prosecution of loansharks. Ali the prosecutor need show is that the defend-
ant charged more than 200Jo interest and that he did not register. 49 
One might, of course, raise questions about the wisdom of section 49 as a 
criminal loansharking statute. The statute is hardly designed to cover only 
those who genuinely merit condemnation as loansharks, and thus leaves en-
tirely to prosecutional discretion the identification of those warranting 
criminal prosecution. There is also something unsettling about a legislature 
enacting a criminal statute requiring a class known to include both criminals 
and non-criminals to perform an insignificant act, registration, -simply 
because it is expected that the criminals will not comply and can then be 
prosecuted for the failure to perform the meaningless act. so 
Whatever one may think of section 49 as a criminal statute, the question 
remains of the effect to be given the statute in civil litigation of the sort ex-
emplified by the Begeljer case. If, as is suggested herein, one cannot 
plausibly read the statute as embodying a policy against charging interest 
and expenses in excess of 200Jo, even by unregistered lenders, then the 
Begeljer Court was certainly correct in declining to read the statute as re-
quiring that loans calling for interest in excess of 200Jo be declared void. Yet, 
for the same reason, it is difficult to see why the courts should grant refor-
mation of a loan made by an unregistered lender to reduce the charges for 
interest and expenses to 200Jo. A decree of reformation, albeit to a lesser ex-
tent than a decree voiding the contract, gives the borrower a windfall not 
clearly justified by any coherent legislative policy. s 1 
" Though the statute may simplify the prosecutor's proof of his case, one may question 
whether it is likely to facilitate greatly the prosecution of loansharks. The principal problem in 
prosecuting loansharks is that of witness fear. See Goldstock & Coenen, supra note 2. The 
author has been unable to find any evidence that section 49 of chapter 271 has ever been used in 
a criminal prosecution. 
'
0 It has been suggested that section 49(d) may raise self-incrimination problems under Mar-
chetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39 (1968), and Grosso v. United States, 390 U.S. 62 (1968). 
See.Carroll, Contracts and Commercial Law, 1970 ANN. SuRv. MAss. LAW.§ 7.11, at 129. 
However, Marchetti and Grosso, involving federal statutes requiring payment of excise and oc-
cupational taxes on wagering, seem distinguishable since the activities required to be reported 
-wagering-were unlawful apart from the taxation provisions. Charging interest in excess of 
200Jo, however, becomes lawful in Massachusetts upon compliance with the registration provi-
sions of section 49(d). 
51 One might, perhaps, suggest that granting reformation decrees as in Begelfer may en-
courage compliance with the registration requirement, and argue that the decision is justified 
as providing a civil mechanism to complement the enforcement of the criminal statute. That 
9
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The fact remains, of course, that the provision is on the statute books and 
it does provide that loans made in violation of section 49(a) may be declared 
void by the courts upon petition of the borrower. Presumably the legislature 
intended this provision to have some effect. One might say, as the Begeljer 
Court did, that section 49(c) confers discretion on the courts to fashion an 
appropriate remedy in proceedings under section 49(c) guided "by balanc-
ing a number of factors including the importance of the public policy 
against usury, whether a refusal to enforce the term will further that policy, 
the gravity of the misconduct involved, the materiality of the provision to 
the rest of the contract, and the impact of the remedy on the parties rights 
and duties." 52 Yet, one is immediately faced with the problem that it is dif-
ficult to find that the statute does embody any "public policy against 
usury." Perhaps though, if the statute is viewed as directed at loansharking, 
not simply usury, some role can be found for section 49(c). If the evidence 
suggests that the transaction was infected by vices beyond simply a high in-
terest rate, that is, if a court concludes that the transaction is of the sort 
usually associated with loansharking, then, and only then, the court should 
enter a decree voiding the loan under section 49(c). 53 
To be sure, it is somewhat problematic to suggest that the effect of sec-
tion 49(c) should be limited to cases of proven loansharking, since the 
statute itself says nothing about loansharking, let alone provide a definition 
of the term. One might object that it would be a peculiar bit of statutory 
construction to suggest that the scope of section 49(c) is so substantially nar-
rower than the scope of section 49(a). Yet section 49(a) cannot plausibly be 
applied as broadly as its language suggests either. Consider the possibility of 
criminal prosecutions under section 49(a). Aside from the process concerns 
expressed above, 54 no one would be terribly offended by a prosecution of a 
genuine loanshark under section 49(a). Yet if there were a prosecutor suffi-
ciently hardhearted to initiate a criminal prosecution of the pharmacist-
investor Najarian, one would certainly hope that the Supreme Judicial 
argument, however, is open to the obvious rejoinder that the genuine loanshark is no more 
likely to be persuaded to register by the possibility of a civil penalty than by the possibility of 
criminal prosecution. Rather, the civil penalty of reformation is likely to fall on the unwary, 
though not blameworthy, lender who enters into a loan in ignorance of the registration require-
ment of the statute. 
" 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1732-33, 409 N.E.2d at 175. 
" It is less clear whether circumstances can be envisioned warranting reformation of the in-
terest and expense charges to 20%. If the court is convinced that the lender is guilty of loan-
sharking it is difficult to imagine that the court would wish to assist him in collecting the loan, 
even at a reduced interest rate. Yet if the lender is not properly viewed as a loanshark, then, for 
the reasons discussed above, it is not clear that even reformation is warranted. There is, of 
course, nothing in the text of§ 49(c) suggesting that reformation must be appropriate in certain 
cases. The statutory language "may be declared void" certainly permits, even if it does not 
compel, an all or nothing approach. 
•• See text and note at note SO supra. 
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Court would find a way to narrow the scope of section 49(a). The legislature 
simply could not have intended section 49(a) to be taken literally. 
The implicit premise of section 49-that charging interest in excess of 
200Jo may provide some sort of operative definition of loansharking-may 
have seemed more plausible in 1970, a year during which the prime interest 
rate ranged from 8 \12% to 7%, 55 than it does today. 56 Yet even in 1970 the 
legislature was unwilling to accept that equation. As initially proposed, the 
bill which became section 49 did not contain an exception for lenders who 
register with the Attorney General." Had the legislature been willing to sub-
ject to criminal penalties any lender who charged more than 20% interest 
and expenses, there would be nothing anomalous about declaring that such 
loans may be voided. Once the registration exception was included, and the 
normative content of the provision thereby rendered ambiguous, it is far 
less clear that the legislature intended to impose any civil penalty on all per-
sons who may have fallen within the scope of the proscription by failing to 
register. 
Given the peculiarity of the Massachusetts criminal usury statute, and the 
difficulty of identifying a coherent public policy embodied in the statute, it 
is perhaps hard to fault the Court too much for its interpretation of the act 
in Begelfer. As Justice Jackson once suggested in another context, the most 
apt authority on this statute may be Twain-"The more you explain it, the 
more I don't understand it." 58 
§ 3.2 Termination of Franchise Agreement-Unconscionability and 
Good Faith Performance. In Zapatha v. Dairy Mart, Inc., 1 the Supreme 
Judicial Court rejected the argument that a franchise agreement may not 
lawfully be terminated without good cause. 2 The opinion provides the first 
extended discussion by the Massachusetts Court of the concepts of uncon-
scionability and good faith under the Massachusetts Uniform Commercial 
Code ("Code")3 and related principles of general law. 
In 1973, plaintiff Zapatha contacted representatives of Dairy Mart, Inc. 
to discuss the possibility of operating a convenience store under a franchise 
from Dairy Mart. 4 Zapatha was given a brochure describing Dairy Mart's 
franchise operations and a form of franchise agreement. The agreement 
" 56 FED. RES. BULL. A33 (Dec. 1970). And that was high! 
" In the doubly vain hope that this may be read at some future time when 200Jo again seems 
usurious, I should perhaps note that as of this writing the prime rate stands at 18 Y2%. Wall St. 
J., March 4, 1981, at 45, col. 2. 
" See note 8 supra. 
" SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 214 (1947) (Jackson, J., dissenting). 
§ 3.2. ' 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1837, 408 N.E.2d 1370. 
' Id. at 1853, 408 N.E.2d at 1380. 
' G.L. c. 106, §§ 1-101 et seq. 
• 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1838, 408 N.E.2d at 1372. 
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provided that Dairy Mart would license Zapatha and his wife to operate a 
Dairy Mart store, using the franchisor's trademark and merchandising 
methods. 5 The franchisor would provide the store and fixtures and would 
pay rent and utility bills and certain other expenses. 6 The franchisee would 
be required to pay for the starting inventory, to maintain a minimum inven-
tory thereafter, and to pay employees' wages and sales taxes. 7 The fran-
chisor would receive a percentage of gross revenues as a franchise fee. The 
agreement contained a termination provision allowing either party, after 
one year, to terminate the agreement without cause on ninety day's notice. • 
In the event that it terminated the agreement without cause, Dairy Mart 
would be required to purchase the salable inventory at 800Jo of its retail 
price. 9 
Dairy Mart's representative advised Zapatha to read the agreement and 
specifically reviewed the termination clause with him. 10 Zapatha was ad-
vised to consult with an attorney, which he did not do, although Dairy Mart 
told Zapatha that the terms of the agreement were not negotiable. 11 The 
Zapathas signed the agreement and took charge of a store in Agawam. 
Within a year, the Zapathas availed themselves of an opportunity to 
transfer to another store in Springfield, and signed a new agreement in the 
same form concerning the new store. 12 Several years later Dairy Mart asked 
the Zapathas to sign a new form of franchise agreement, some of the terms 
of which were less favorable to the franchisee. 13 When the Zapathas refused 
to execute the new form of agreement, Dairy Mart gave notice that the fran-
chise agreement would be terminated in ninety days. 14 In the termination 
notice Dairy Mart suggested that it remained willing to discuss the execution 
of the new form of agreement and indicated that on termination Dairy Mart 
would purchase the Zapthas' inventory pursuant to the franchise agree-
ment.15 
The Zapathas brought suit to enjoin the termination. The trial court 
found that Dairy Mart's only reason for terminating the agreement was the 
Zapathas' refusal to sign the new form of agreement and declared the at-
tempted termination void. 16 The trial judge's conclusion rested on rulings 
that the clause permitting termination without cause was unconscionable, 
' /d. at 1839, 408 N.E.2d at 1372-73. 
6 !d. 
7 !d. 
' !d. at 1839, 408 N.E.2d at 1373 . 
• /d. 
•• /d. at 1840, 408 N.E.2d at 1373. 
11 /d. 
" /d. 
13 !d. 
" /d. 
" /d. 
" !d. at 1841, 408 N.E.2d at 1374. 
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that the termination without cause violated Dairy Mart's obligation of good 
faith, and that the termination without cause constituted an "unfair 
method of competition and unfair and deceptive act'' under chapter 93A, 
section 2. 17 On direct appeal the Supreme Judicial Court reversed. 18 
The Court first considered the question whether the franchise agreement 
was governed by Article Two of the Code. Section 2-102 provides that Arti-
cle Two applies to "transactions in goods." 19 Although "transaction" is. 
undefined, section 2-105(1) does provide a definition of "goods" as "things 
... which are movable .... " 20 Although the franchise agreement required 
the Zapathas to purchase some goods from Dairy Mart, about 700Jo of the 
goods sold by the Zapathas were purchased from other sources. 21 Perhaps 
more significantly, the Court noted that the essence of the agreement was 
the exchange of intangible rights, obligations, and services, whereby Dairy 
Mart licensed its business methods and trademark to the Zapathas in ex-
change for the franchise fee and the expectation that the Zapathas would 
enhance the reputation of the Dairy Mart franchise chain. 22 Since the sale of 
goods from Dairy Mart to the Zapathas was only a minor aspect of the en-
tire relationship, 23 the Court concluded that the agreement was not explicit-
ly governed by the sales article of the Code. 24 Nonetheless, the Court ruled 
that the Article Two provisions concerning unconscionability and good 
faith expressed legislative statements of policy of wider application than the 
scope of the Sales Article of the Code, and therefore these provisions could 
be applied to the franchise agreement by analogy. 2s 
17 ld. 
18 /d. at 1838, 408 N.E.2d at 1372. 
19 G.L. c. 106, § 2-102. 
20 G.L. c. 106, § 2-105(1). 
21 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1842-43, 408 N.E.2d at 1374-75. 
22 Id. at 1843 n.9, 408 N.E.2d at 1375 n.9. 
" Id. at 1843, 408 N.E.2d at 1375. 
,. Id. 
" /d. In dictum the Court stated that it would be disinclined to apply Article Two selectively 
to those aspects of an agreement which do concern transactions in goods, since different prin-
ciples of law might then apply to different parts of the same agreement. Were the Court con-
fronted with such a situation-for example, disputes over shipment or price terms, or issues 
of passage of title, breach of warranty-it would seem anomalous not to apply Article Two 
simply because the agreement also involved matters other than the sale of goods. Applying dif-
ferent principles of law to similar sales transactions is no less undesirable than applying dif-
ferent rules to different portions of an agreement. Of course, the Court might resolve the prob-
lem by the technique of applying Article Two by analogy to the goods aspects of mixed 
agreements. Moreover, to the extent that Article Two principles become a source of guidance 
in the development of the common law of contracts, See U .C.C. § 1-102, Comment 1; Landis, 
Statutes and the Source of Law, in HARVARD LEGAL EssAYS (R. Pounded. 1934); Note, The 
Uniform Commercial Code as a Premise for Judicial Reasoning, 65 CoLUM. L. REV. 880 
(1965), the likelihood that non-Article Two law will be significantly different is diminished. Ar-
ticle Two coverage problems are likely to be most difficult where the applicable non-Article 
Two law would be statutory. For example, the Article Two statute of limitations is four years, 
13
Rogers: Chapter 3: Contracts and Commercial Law
Published by Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School, 1980
82 1980 ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETTS LAW § 3.2 
The Court rejected plaintiffs' argument that the clause in the franchise 
agreement permitting termination without cause was unconscionable. Sec-
tion 2-302 of the Code provides that: 
If the Court as a matter of law finds the contract or any clause of the 
contract to have been unconscionable at the time it was made the court 
may refuse to enforce the contract, or it may enforce the remainder of 
the contract without the unconscionable clause, or it may so limit the 
application of any unconscionable clause, as to avoid any uncon-
scionable result. 26 
The term "unconscionable" is undefined in the Code and the text of section 
2-302 provides little guidance in identifying relevant considerations. Among 
the many issues left open by the text of the statute is whether the section is 
directed at defects in the bargaining process or the unfairness of particular 
contract terms. 27 In the Zapatha case, the Court noted that the official com-
ments to the section state, inter alia, that "[t]he principle is one of preven-
tion of oppression and unfair surprise .... " 28 Drawing on this comment, 
the Zapatha Court appeared to take the position that unconscionability re-
quires findings of both "procedural" defects, under the heading of "unfair 
surprise," and "substantive" unfairness, under the heading of "oppres-
sion. " 29 
In analyzing the contention that the termination clause was unconscion-
able, the Court first noted that the Code itself appears to sanction clauses 
permitting termination without cause. 30 Section 2-309, dealing explicitly 
with termination clauses, provides that: 
Termination of a contract by one party except on the happening of an 
§ 2-725, while the general contracts statute of limitation in Massachusetts is six years, G.L. c. 
260, § 12. 
With respect to the Code obligation of good faith, the Article Two coverage issue might at 
first seem irrelevant, since the obligation of good faith is imposed in Article One, § 1-203. 
There is, however, no general scope provision for Article One or the Code as a whole. Thus Ar-
ticle One applies only if a transaction or contract falls within the scope of one of the specific 
Articles of the Code. 
26 G.L. c. 106, § 2-302. 
27 See generally Leff, Unconscionability and the Code-The Emperor's New Clause, 115 U. 
PA. L. REV. 485 (1967). 
21 G.L. c. 106, § 2-302, Comment 1. 
., "[U)nconscionability must be determined on a case by case basis ... giving particular at-
tention to whether, at the time of execution of the agreement, the contract provision could 
result in unfair surpirse and was oppressive to the allegedly disadvantaged party." 1980 Mass. 
Adv. Sh. at 1845, 408 N.E.2d at 1376 (emphasis added). "This two-part test for uncon-
scionability involves determining whether there was 'an absence of meaningful choice on the 
part of one of the parties together with contract terms which are unreasonably favorable to the 
other party.' ... The inquiry involves a search for components of 'procedural' and 'substan-
tive' unconscionability.'' /d. at 1846 n.13, 408 N.E.2d at 1377 n.13 (quoting Williams v. 
Walllter-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 449 (D.C. Cir. 1965)). 
•• 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1845-46,408 N.E.2d at 1376. 
14
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agreed event requires that reasonable notification be received by the 
other party and an agreement dispensing witli notification is invalid if 
its operation would be unconscionable. 31 
83 
Since termination other than "upon the happening of an agreed event," 
would include termination without cause, the Court reasoned that section 
2-309 may be taken to authorize such terminations, at least when proper 
notice is given. 32 
Reviewing the various aspects of unconscionability the Court found no 
basis for ruling that the termination clause was vulnerable because of unfair 
surprise. 33 The Court noted that the clause was not obscurely worded or 
buried in fine print; that Dairy Mart's representative specifically called 
Zapatha's attention to the provision and suggested that Zapatha consult an 
attorney; and that Zapatha had significant experience and education in 
business matters. 34 Similarly, the Court concluded that the termination 
clause was not oppressive, in the sense of substantively unfair. 35 In its 
analysis of substantive fairness the Court focused on issues of forfeiture 
and unjust enrichment. Termination of franchise agreements may present 
particularly troublesome issues where the termination prevents the fran-
chisee from recouping his investment in the franchise. This is particularly 
the case when a substantial initial franchise payment or investment is re-
quired and the franchisor terminates the agreement shortly after its incep-
tion. The franchisee may then be left with assets of little value other than in 
connection with the franchise operation, such as special purpose fixtures, 
equipment, signs, and the like. 36 The problem is also apparent where the 
franchisee has devoted substantial effort and investment to the promotion 
of the franchisor's goodwill. 37 The Court observed that such elements were 
" G.L. c. 106, § 2-309. 
" The fact that the Zapatha Court did not conclude its analysis of the unconscionability 
issue upon discussion of § 2-309 suggests that the Court does not view § 2-309 as precluding a 
finding that a termination without cause provision is unconscionable. But see Artman v. Inter-
national Harvester, Co., 355 F.Supp. 482, 490 (W.D. Pa. 1972) (termination permitted by§ 
2-309 "is simply not an unconscionable practice within the meaning of § 2-302. "). This is but 
one illustration of the general question whether a provision which is permissible under a 
specific section of the Code may be held unconscionable under§ 2-302. See Leff, supra note 
27, at 522-24. 
" 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1846, 408 N.E.2d at 1376. 
•• 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1846-47, 408 N.E. 2d at 1376-77. Mr. Zapatha testified that he 
understood the termination provision and considered it straightforward; however, he 
understood it to mean that Dairy Mart could terminate the agreement only for cause. /d. at 
1839, 1846, 408 N.E.2d at 1373, 1377. 
" /d. at 1847, 408 N.E.2d at 1377. 
36 See generally Gellhorn, Limitations on Contract Termination Rights-Franchise 
Cancellations, 1967 DUKE L. J. 465. 
37 /d. 
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largely absent in the Zapatha case. 38 Dairy Mart provided the Zapathas with 
a going business at a fully equipped store. The Zapathas were required only 
to purchase the inventory, and upon termination Dairy Mart was required 
to repurchase the inventory at a fair valuation. The Zapathas received their 
net prot1ts from the operation during the term of the agreement and had not 
been required to make any unrecoverable financial investment. 39 Thus, 
upon termination the Zapathas were in substantially the same economic 
position as prior to the arrangement. 40 Accordingly, the Court ruled that 
the termination clause was not unconscionable. 41 
The Zapathas also argued that the exercise of the termination clause 
violated section 1-203 of the Code, which provides that "[e]very contract or 
duty within this Act imposes an obligation of good faith in its performance 
or enforcement. " 42 Good faith, for purposes of the Code in general, is 
defined in section 1-201(19) as "honesty in fact in the conduct or transac-
tion involved. " 43 The term, however, is given a special definition in Article 
Two. Section 2-103(1)(b) provides that, "[i]n this Article unless the context 
otherwise requires ... 'good faith' in the case of a merchant means honesty 
in fact and the observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair deal-
ing in the trade. " 44 Though the Court considered this special definition of 
good faith applicable to the Zapatha case, 45 the requirement of observance 
" 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1847, 408 N.E.2d at 1377. 
•• ld. at 1847-48, 408 N.E.2d at 1377-78. 
•• Id. at 1848, 408 N.E.2d at 1378. 
•• Id . 
., G.L. c. 106, § 1-203. 
•• G.L. c. 106, § 1-201(19). 
•• G.L. c. 106, § 2-103(l)(b). 
•• Some textual problems are presented by the assumption that in the context of sales trans-
actions the§ 1-203 good faith obligation is to be tested by the§ 2-103(1)(b) definition of good 
faith as including observance of reasonable commercial standards. Section 2-103(1)(b) is, in 
terms, simply a definition of the words "good faith" as used in Article Two. Thus, on a literal 
reading the stricter standard of good faith would be applicable only where the term "good 
faith'' explicitly appears in the provisions of Article Two. The general obligation of good faith 
performance, however, is found in Article One. Some commentators who have noted the tex-
tual problem have urged that in transactions governed by Article Two the Article Two defini-
tion of good faith be considered applicable to the § 1-203 obligation of good faith perform-
ance. Farnsworth, Good Faith Performance and Commercial Reasonableness Under the 
Uniform Commercial Code, 30 U. CHI. L. REV. 666, 675-76 (1963). Cf. Summers, "Good 
Faith" in General Contract Law and the Sales Provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code, 
54 VA. L. REV. 195, 212-13 (1968). The courts seem to have assumed that interpretation 
without discussion. See, e.g., Sherrock v. Commercial Credit Corp., 269 A.2d 407 (Del. Sup. 
Ct. 1970) (dictum), rev'd, 290 A.2d 648 (Del. 1972). Indeed, the Delaware Superior Court in 
Sherrock was so captivated by the notion that merchants should be held to a more stringent 
standard of good faith that it applied the§ 2-103(1)(b) definition to the interpretation of "good 
faith" in Article Nine! The Delaware Supreme Court set things straight on that score. 
The application of the stricter definition of good faith in the Zapatha case also requires that 
Dairy Mart be considered a "merchant," defined in§ 2-104 as one "who deals in goods of the 
16
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of reasonable commercial standards was of little assistance to the Zapathas. 
The Court stated that there was no evidence that Dairy Mart failed to 
observe such standards. 46 Thus, the good faith analysis was reduced to an 
examination of Dairy Mart's honesty. The Court noted that Dairy Mart 
clearly expressed its right to terminate in the franchise agreement and exer-
cised that right for an openly disclosed reason-the Zapathas' refusal to 
sign the new form of agreement. 47 Some problem was presented by a 
brochure Dairy Mart provided to the Zapathas before the agreement was 
signed. The brochure somewhat misleadingly described the franchise ar-
rangement as providing the franchisee "a life of security and comfort. " 48 
The Court, however, ruled that in view of the explicit termination clause of 
the franchise agreement, Dairy Mart's use of the brochure could not sup-
port a finding of dishonesty. 49 
Although the Court found no violation of the unconscionability or good 
faith provisions of the Code, the Court suggested that the agreement and 
Dairy Mart's performance thereunder should be tested against general prin-
ciples of law designed to ''provide protection from conduct that has pro-
duced an unfair and burdensome result, contrary to the spirit of the 
bargain, against which the law should reasonably provide protection. " 50 
The Court indicated that such principles might have a wider scope than the 
unconscionability and good faith provisions of the Code. 51 
kind or otherwise by his occupation holds himself out as having knowledge or skill peculiar to 
the practices or goods involved in the transactions .... " The Court stated that "[t]here is no 
doubt that Dairy Mart is a merchant," 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1842 n.7, 408 N.E.2d at 1374 
n. 7, a somewhat peculiar conclusion given that the Court had previously stated that the sale of 
goods aspect of the transaction was insignificant, id. at 1843, 408 N.E.2d at 1375. Perhaps the 
Court was applying the term "merchant" by analogy in a non-sales transaction, or perhaps the 
use of the word "practices" in the definition of "merchant" is to be considered significant. 
•• /d. at 1848, 408 N.E.2d at 1378. The assumption that reliance on the reasonable commer-
cial standards aspect of the Article Two good faith definition requires proof of the existence of 
such standards in the trade finds some support in the case law. See Eastern Air Lines, Inc. v. 
Gulf Oil Corp., 415 F. Supp. 429 (S.D. Fla. 1975); First Nat'I. Bank v. Crone, 157 Ind. App. 
665, 301 N.E.2d 378 (1973). On the other hand, the very wording of the provision, referring to 
"reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing" (emphasis added) suggests that existing 
practices should not necessarily be determinative. A general trade practice of cheating should 
hardly be definitive of good faith. Cf. The T.J. Hooper, 60 F.2d 737 (2nd Cir.), cert. denied, 
287 u.s. 662 (1932) . 
., 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1848, 408 N.E.2d at 1378. 
" /d. at 1838 n.3, 408 N.E.2d at 1372 n.3. 
" /d. at 1849, 408 N.E.2d at 1378. 
'" /d. at 1850, 408 N.E.2d at 1379. 
" In a footnote the Court noted that the unconscionability provision focuses on the terms of 
the contract, as distinguished from the character of a parties' performance under the contract, 
and that the inquiry must be directed to the terms of the contract at the time it is executed. /d. 
at 1850 n.17, 408 N.E.2d at 1379 n.17. With respect to the good faith obligation, the Court 
noted that a party's conduct might be honest, and, in the case of a merchant, adhere to stand-
ards of his trade, yet be unfair and unreasonably burdensome. /d. 
17
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In assessing Dairy Mart's performance under these general principles, the 
Court considered the effect of the recent decision in Fortune v. National 
Cash Register52 on contract provisions permitting termination without 
cause. In Fortune a salesman employed under a contract permitting ter-
mination without cause was fired shortly before he would have become en-
titled to certain bonus payments. 53 The Fortune Court held that although 
the termination complied with the contract provision, the contract "con-
tains an implied convenant of good faith and fair dealing, and a termination 
not made in good faith constitutes a breach of the contract." 54 Although it 
has been suggested that the Fortune good faith standard is tantamount to a 
holding that an at will employment contract may not be terminated without 
cause, 55 the Zapatha Court's reading of Fortune casts doubt on that inter-
pretation. The Court indicated that the determinative factor in Fortune was 
not that the employee was discharged without cause, but that that employer 
fired the employee "in order to avoid the payment of amounts earned, but 
not yet payable. " 56 Applying Fortune principles to the instant case, the 
Court noted that the termination of the Zapathas' franchise did not deprive 
the Zapathas of income which they had fairly earned, usurp funds to which 
they were entitled, or appropriate the benefit of goodwill generated through 
their efforts. 57 Thus, the termination could not be considered a violation of 
implied requirements of good faith and fair dealing, unless such good faith 
As a source of authority for these general principles, the Court cited RESTATEMENT (SECOND) 
OF CoNTRACTS§ 231 (Tent. Drafts Nos. 1-7 1973), which states that "[e]very contract imposes 
upon each party a duty of good faith and fair dealing in its performance and its enforcement." 
Although the Restatement comments refer to the Code definition of good faith, it is ctear that 
a broader concept is embodied in the Restatement provision. Concerning good faith perform-
ance of a contract, Comment a to§ 231 states that the concept "emphasizes faithfulness to an 
agreed common purpose and consistency with the justified expectation of the other party; it ex-
cludes a variety of types of conduct characterized a8 involving 'bad faith' because they violate 
community standards of decency, fairness or reasonableness." Also, Comment d notes that 
"fair dealing may require more than honesty." /d. 
" 373 Mass. 96, 364 N.E.2d 1251 (197'7). 
" Id. at 97-100, 364 N.E.2d at 1253-54. 
•• /d. at 101, 364 N.E.2d at 1256. 
" See Glendon & Lev, Changes in the Bonding of the Employment Relationship: An Essay 
on the New Property, 20 B.C.L. REv. 457, 472 (1979). 
" 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1851, 408 N.E.2d at 1379. The difference between a bad faith 
standard and a good cause standard might be illustrated by the extent to which each modifies 
the old saw that an employee can be fired for good reason, bad reason, or no reason at all. A 
bad faith standard eliminates only "bad reason," while a good cause standard also eliminates 
"no reason at all." In more technical terni.s the difference seems to come to a difference in the 
burden of proof, with the employee bearing the burden of proving bad reasons under a bad 
faith standard, and the employer bearing the burden of proving good reasons under a "good 
cause'' standard. 
" /d. at 1852, 408 N.E.2d at 1380. 
18
Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law, Vol. 1980 [1980], Art. 6
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/asml/vol1980/iss1/6
§ 3.2 CONTRACTS AND COMMERCIAL LAW 87 
principles were extended to prohibit any termination without cause. The 
Court expressly declined to adopt such a position. ss 
The Zapatha Court's refusal to adopt a principle prohibiting the use of 
termination without cause provisions in franchise agreements is not surpris-
ing. Franchisees have met with little success in arguing that such termina-
tion clauses violate the unconscionability or good faith requirements of the 
Code or are otherwise unlawful. 59 The Zapatha opinion, however, contains 
suggestive dicta indicating that on different facts judicial relief against fran-
chise terminations may be available. The Court's emphasis on the 
Zapathas' failure to demonstrate that the termination would effect a 
forfeiture of their reasonable investment expectations may be taken to sug-
gest that the presence of such factors would lead to a different result. Thus, 
if the termination deprives the franchisee of an opportunity to recoup its 
original investment, or leaves the franchisee with unsaleable inventory or 
special purpose equipment and supplies of little value except in connection 
with the franchise operation, an action by the franchisee to enjoin the ter-
mination or seek damages should certainly not be foreclosed by the Zapatha 
decision. Indeed, Zapatha would be a useful precedent for the franchisee in 
such a case. 61 
Although the absence of elements of forfeiture of reasonable investment 
expectations or appropriation of goodwill makes the Zapatha case a less 
than egregious instance of franchise termination, the franchisee may have 
other interests deserving of protection. Whether or not the franchise agree-
" /d. 
Considering the Zapathas' claim under section 2 of chapter 93A, the Court noted that that 
section provides that the interpretations of the Federal Trade Commission Act are to serve as a 
guide to the meaning of the phrase "unfair or deceptive acts or practices," and that the 
Zapathas cited no case or Federal Trade Commission ruling suggesting that termination of a 
franchise agreement without cause is an unfair or deceptive act or practice. 1980 Mass. Adv. 
Sh. at 1852, 408 N.E.2d at 1350. 
" See generally Gellhom, supra note 36. 
•• 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1847, 408 N.E.2d at 1377 
•• It is not entirely clear, however, precisely how the analysis would proceed in such a case. 
Since the Zapatha opinion appears to require a showing of both procedural and S\lbstantive un-
conscionability under U .C.C. § 2-302, that provision would be of little use to a franchisee if the 
termination clause has been adequately brought to his attention. Similarly, the good faith 
obligation of U .C.C. § 1-203 will not avail the franchisee absent a factual showing that the ter-
mination was not consistent with the commercial standards of franchisors. Presumably then, 
the franchisee would have to rely on the general principles of law to which the Zapatha Court 
alluded. The Zapatha Court did not explicitly consider whether such general principles of law 
would warrant relief against a substantively unfair termination in the absence of any pro-
cedural defects in the contract formation process. Perhaps the Fortune case can be taken as 
supporting an affirmative answer, since there appears to have been no inquiry in Fortune con-
cerning whether the employee could plausibly claim surprise over the operation of the termina-
tion clause. 
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ment includes a termination without cause provision, a person entering into 
a franchise business doubtless anticipates that he is embarking on a continu-
ing venture, and it is surely in the franchisor's interests that the franchisee 
entertain such expectations. 62 Having devoted his working efforts to a par-
ticular endeavor, and foregone other opportunities, the franchisee's expec-
tations of a continuing relationship are not insubstantial. 63 At one point in 
the Zapatha opinion the Court suggested that in order to demonstrate un-
conscionability, in the substantive sense, the franchisee must "sustain [the] 
burden of showing that the agreement allocated the risks and benefits con-
nected with termination in an unreasonably disproportionate way and that 
the termination provision was not reasonably related to legitimate commer-
cial needs of [the franchisor.]" 64 If it is assumed that the francisor has ter-
minated the agreement literally without cause, that standard can be con-
siderd satisfied only if no weight at all is given to the franchisee's interests in 
maintaining the relationship. Perhaps the Court feared that requiring the 
franchisor to demonstrate cause would impose an undue burden on even 
legitimately motivated terminations, if only because of the franchisor's fear 
of litigation costs. Moreover, there is some suggestion in the opinion that 
imposition of a cause standard should be left to the legislature. The Court 
noted that Massachusetts has adopted statutes requiring cause for the ter-
mination of only certain types of franchises. 6 s 
Even if a cause standard is not implied, there may be reason to question 
the legitimacy of the termination involved in the Zapatha case. The Fortune 
case surely may be taken to mean that a termination in bad faith would be 
impermissible. In Zapatha the trial court found that the sole reason for the 
termination was the Zapathas' refusal to sign the new form of franchise 
agreement suggested by Dairy Mart. 66 In effect, then, the franchisor was us-
ing the termination clause as a way of permitting it unilaterally to change 
any of the other terms of the agreement. The good faith issues raised by 
such a use of a termination clause are not insubstantial. 67 The general 
" Thus, in the Zapatha case, Dairy Mart's brochure soliciting franchisees was hardly 
designed to attract persons expecting a short-term arrangement. "We're looking for a partner 
... who can take the tools we offer and build a life of security and comfort .... " 1980 Mass. 
Adv. Sh. at 1838 n.3, 408 N.E.2d at 1372 n.3 
63 See generally Glendon & Lev, supra note 55; Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L. J. 733 
(1964). 
64 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1848, 408 N.E.2d at 1377. 
6
' Id. at 1851 & n.18, 408 N.E.2d at 1379 &n.18 (citing G.L. c. 938, § 4(3)(e) (motor vehicle 
dealers); G.L. c. 93E, §§ 5, 5A (gasoline stations)). 
66 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1841, 408 N.E.2d at 1374. 
67 Cf Summers, supra note 45, at 243-48 (bad faith in raising and resolving contract 
disputes to obtain favorable modifications); U.C.C. § 2-209, Comment 2 ("[A)n agreement 
modifying a sales contract needs no consideration to be binding. However, modifications must 
meet the test of good faith imposed by this Act. The effective use of bad faith to escape 
performance on the original contract terms is barred, and the extortion of a 'modification' 
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obligation of good faith performance of contracts may be taken to pro-
scribe the use of contract provisions to achieve results "contrary to the 
spirit of the bargain. " 68 The Restatement (Second) of Contracts states that 
"good faith performance or enforcement of a contract emphasizes 
faithfulness to an agreed common purpose and consistency with the 
justified expectations of the other party .... " 69 
A party's invocation of a termination without cause provision to force 
the other party to accept a modification of other provisions of the contract 
may or may not be consistent with the obligations of good faith, depending 
on the parties' understanding, at the time the contract is formed, of the ef-
fect of the termination clause. If the parties attention has been directed to 
the termination clause in such fashion that they understand that no commit-
ment whatsoever is being made to continue the relationship on the existing 
terms, then there can be little objection to a termination motivated by one 
party's refusal to accept a proposed modification. Perhaps the Zapatha 
opinion is to be understood as resting on the conclusion that the Zapathas 
did or should reasonably have understood the termination provision to have 
this effect. 70 The difficulty with such an approach is the likelihood that ter-
mination clauses are frequently included in agreements simply as a matter 
of drafting tidiness, without great consideration being given to the effect of 
the clause. Even where the parties have focused their attention on the ex-
istence of a termination without cause provision, it is by no means clear that 
they will have contemplated that such a provision may effectively render the 
balance of the contract nugatory. It seems more likely that one who accepts 
a termination without cause provision assumes that the other party will not 
actually terminate for no reason whatsoever-we are simply not in the habit 
of viewing the decisions of competent adults as the product of mental 
Brownian motion. Rather, one assumes that the other party is unwilling to 
subject his actual, and probably not invalid, reasons for termination to ex-
amination in litigation. 71 It is a different matter, however, fully to realize 
that a termination clause may be used not for the purpose of actually ter-
minating the arrangement but for the purpose of altering its terms. It might 
not have been inappropriate to have ruled that Diary Mart's exercise of the 
termination power was sufficiently inconsistent with the reasonable expec-
tations of the parties to the contract as to amount to bad faith, at least in the 
absence of evidence suggesting that the franchisor had apprised the fran-
chisee in advance of the possibility that it might propose a modification of 
the agreement on a take it or leave it basis. 
without legitimate commercial reason is ineffective as a violation of the duty of good faith.") 
" 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1850, 408 N.E.2d at 1379. 
69 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 231, Comment a (Tent. Drafts Nos. 1-7 1973). 
70 See 1980 Mass. Adv. Jh. at 1846-47, 408 N.E.2d at 1376-77. 
" Cf. Leff, supra note 27, at 50't. 
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§ 3.3 Insurance Policies-Effect of Untimely Notice-Prospective 
Overruling. In Johnson Controls, Inc. v. Bowes, 1 the Supreme Judicial 
Court announced a significant change in Massachusetts law concerning the 
effect of an insured's breach of a provision of a liability insurance policy re-
quiring that the insured give timely notice of occurrences and claims. 
Henceforth the insurer will be permitted to disclaim coverage on the 
grounds of untimely notice only if the delay has prejudiced the insurer's in-
terests. 2 The new rule, however, will be given only prospective application. 3 
In 1973 Johnson Controls brought a malpractice action against its at-
torney, Bowes} Although Bowes carried malpractice insurance, he did not 
notify his insurer of the action. s The insurer first learned of the suit when 
contacted by Johnson Controls' attorney some six months after suit was 
filed. 6 The insurer notified Bowes that it disclaimed coverage and would not 
defend the action, on the grounds of Bowes' failure to comply with the 
notice provision of the policy. 7 Johnson Controls was awarded a judgment 
in excess of thirty thousand dollars in the malpractice action. 8 It then 
brought an action against the insurer to reach and apply the proceeds of the 
insurance policy. The superior court granted the insurer's motion for sum-
mary judgment. 9 On direct appellate review the Supreme Judicial Court 
overruled its prior decisions on the effect of an insured's noncompliance 
with notice provisions of an insurance policy and held that untimely notice 
should relieve the insurer of liability only if the insurer proves that it has 
sustained prejudice as a result of the delay Y Noting that the decision 
represented "a drastic or radical incursion upon existing law," the Court 
confined its decision to claims arising after the date of the opinion. 11 
Accordingly, the Superior Court's dismissal of Johnson Controls' claim 
was affirmed.U 
The Supreme Judicial Court indicated that in Massachusetts, as in many 
§ 3.3. ' 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1831, 409 N.E.2d 185. 
' /d. at 1835, 409 N.E.2d at 188. 
' /d. at 1836, 409 N.E.2d at 188. 
• /d. at 1832, 409 N.E.2d at 186. 
'/d. 
• /d. 
' /d. The policy required the insured to give notice to the insurer of an occurrence covered · 
by the policy "as soon as practicable," and to "immediately forward" to the insurer any de-
mand or summons received if a claim was made or suit filed against the insured. /d. at 1832 
n.2, 409 N.E.2d at 186 n.2. 
• /d. at 1832, 409 N.E.2d at 186. 
• /d. at 1831, 409 N.E.2d at 186. 
•• Id. at 1835, 409 N.E.2d at 188. 
" /d. at 1835-36, 409 N.E.2d at 188 (quoting Diaz v. Eli Lilly & Co., 364 Mass. 153, 167, 
302 N.E.2d 555, 564 (1973)). 
" Id. at 1836, 409 N.E.2d at 188. 
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other jurisdictions, the courts have traditionally construed the notice provi-
sions of liability insurance policies strictly. 13 Viewing compliance with 
notice provisions as a condition precedent to coverage, the insurer has been 
relieved of liability where the insured failed to give timely notice, irrespec-
tive of whether the insurer's position has been prejudiced by the delay. 14 
The Johnson Controls Court noted that there is a trend in recent decisions 
away from the strict contractual approach toward the view that delayed 
notice should absolve the insurer of liability only in the event that the in-
surer has sustained prejudice.•' The Court cited decisions in Pennsylvania 
and New Jersey noting that an approach based on strict construction of the 
parties' contractual arrangements is inapt in light of the insured's general 
inability to negotiate the terms of an insurance policy, and that strict ap-
plication of notice provisions effects a forfeiture of the coverage for which 
the insured has paid. 16 Inasmuch as the purpose of notice clauses is to en-
sure that the insurer has an adequate opportunity to investigate and defend 
claims, the Court concluded that it is inappropriate to relieve the carrier of 
liability where timely notice would not substantially have improved the in-
surer's position. 17 Accordingly, the Court ruled that in order for the insurer 
" /d. at 1833, 409 N.E.2d at 187. 
14 E.g., Rose v. Regan, 344 Mass. 223, 226, 181 N.E.2d 796, 798 (1962); Comment, The 
Materiality of Prejudice to the Insurer as a Result of the Insured's Failure to Give Timely 
Notice, 74 DICK. L. REv. 260 (1970). Though adopted here as a convenient locution, the 
reference to a "traditional approach" to untimely notice issues probably overstates the 
uniformity of the decisions. The ~iew that prejudice to the insurer is material has long been 
adopted in many jurisdictions. Cases are collected in Annot., 76 A.L.R. 23, 201 (1932); 
Annot., 123 A.L.R. 950, 984 (1939); Annot., 18 A.L.R.2d 443, 479 (1951). 
" 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1833, 409 N.E.2d at 187. 
With respect to motor vehicle liability policies, the law concerning the effect of delayed 
notice has recently been reformed by the Massachusetts Legislature. Section 112 of chapter 175 
of the General Laws, as amended in 1977, provides that a motor vehicle liability insurer ''shall 
not deny insurance coverage to an insured because of failure of the insured to seasonably 
notify an insurance company of an occurrence, incident, claim or a suit founded upon an oc-
currence, incident or claim, which may give rise to liability insured against unless the insurance 
company has been prejudiced thereby." In Spooner v. General Accident Fire & Life Assur. 
Corp., 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2657, 397 N.E .. 2d 1290, the Court declined to abrogate the strict 
aproach to untimely notice with respect to claims under motor vehicle liability policies arising 
prior to the effective date of the 1977 amendment. Noting that the Legislature had not made 
the change in the common law retroactive, and that the Court had not previously questioned 
the soundness of the traditional approach, the Spooner Court declined to "depart retroactively 
from the meaning and import ... given for at least two generations to a significant condition 
of contracts of insurance." 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2659, 397 N.E.2d at 1291. Since Johnson 
Controls involved an insurance policy not covered by section 112, the Court concluded that the 
case "presented a more appropriate vehicle for reconsideration of our common law." 1980 
Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1833, 409 N.E.2d at 187. 
16 /d. at 1834, 409 N.E.2d at 187 (citing Brakeman v. Potomac Ins. Co., 472 Pa. 66, 371 
A.2d 193 (1977)); Cooper v. Government Employees Ins. Co., 51 N.J. 86,237 A.2d 870 (1968). 
" 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1834-35, 409 N.E.2d at 187-88. 
23
Rogers: Chapter 3: Contracts and Commercial Law
Published by Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School, 1980
92 1980 ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETTS LAW § 3.3 
to be relieved from liability due to untimely notice, "the insurance company 
will be required to prove both that the notice provision was in fact breached 
and that the breach resulted in prejudice to its position." 18 
The determination that the insurer should not be permitted to disclaim 
coverage in the absence of prejudice does not, of course, answer the critical 
issue of the burden of proof. Curiously, however, the Johnson Controls 
opinion does not expressly address the issue. Those jurisdictions which con-
sider the issue of prejudice to the insurer relevant have divided on the 
burden of proof issue. 19 In some jurisdictions the insurer is presumed to 
have sustained prejudice from delayed notice unless the insured proves the 
absence of prejudice. 20 In other jurisdictions the insurer bears the burden of 
proving prejudice in order to escape liability. 21 Authorities supporting the 
view that the insured must prove the absence of prejudice note that it may 
be extremely difficult for the insurer to demonstrate actual prejudice. Since, 
by hypothesis, the insurer has not had the opportunity to conduct a prompt 
investigation, it may be difficult or impossible for the insurer to show with 
specificity what it might have been able to accomplish by such an investiga-
tion. Moreover, it is said that since the insured is seeking to absolve itself of 
the consequences of an admitted breach of the policy conditions, it is not 
unfair to require the insured to establish adequate grounds of excuse. 22 On 
the other hand, the fact that the insurer's claim of prejudice may often be 
speculative can be taken to support the view that prejudice to the insurer 
should not be presumed. 23 Furthermore, the experience of jurisdictions 
which place the burden of proof on the insurer indicates that the insurer's 
burden is not insurmountable. Insurers have in various situations been able 
to satisfy the burden of proving prejudice, as where witnesses have disap-
peared in the period between the occurrence and notification of the 
insurer. 24 
Although the Johnson Controls Court did not discuss the issue of burden 
of proof, the Court's language makes it quite clear that the insurer bears the 
burden of proving prejudice. 25 Given that the arguments on the issue are 
" /d. at 1835, 409 N.E.2d at 188. 
19 See 8 J. APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE§ 4732 at 17-19 (1962); Comment, 
supra note 14, at 266-72. 
20 E.g., Jennings v. Horace Mann Mutual Ins. Co., 549 F.2d 1364, 1367-68 (lOth Cir. 1977) 
(Colo. law). 
" E.g., Campbell v. Allstate Ins. Co., 60 Cal.2d 303, 32 Cal. Rptr. 827, 384 P.2d 155 
(1963). 
" 8 J. APPLEMAN, supra note 19. 
" Campbell v. Allstate Ins. Co., 60 Cal.2d 303, 307, 32 Cal. Rptr. 827, 829, 384 P.2d 155, 
157 (1963). 
" E.g., Kermans v. Pendleton, 62 Mich. App. 576, 233 N.W.2d 658 (1975); Lumbermens 
Mut. Cas. Co. v. Oliver, 115 N.H. 141, 335 A.2d 666 (1975). 
" 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1835, 409 N.E.2d at 188 ("[W)here an insurance company at-
tempts to be relieved of its obligations under a liability policy ... on the ground of untimely 
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nearly in equipoise, the Court's ruling is certainly not inappropriate, though 
the failure to discuss the issue is puzzling. Support for the Court's conclu-
sion on the issue may be found in the fact that the Massachusetts 
legislature's recent statutory abrogation of the traditional approach to un-
timely notice in the field of motor vehicle liability policies26 seems to place 
the burden of proving prejudice on the insurer. 27 There could be little 
justification for adopting different rules on the burden of proof for motor 
vehicle liability policies and for other types of liability insurance. 
The Court's treatment of the retroactivity issue seems unsatisfactory. The 
Court stated that since the ''reform of the notice requirements constitutes 'a 
drastic or radical incursion upon existing law,' which would disturb retroac-
tively the contractual arrangements of the insurer and the insured, " 28 and 
since "reliance interests exert a strong influence" 29 in matters of contact 
law, the new rule is to be confined "to claims arising after the date of the 
opinion. " 30 The Court rejected the alternative of giving the new ruling 
limited retroactive application by applying the new rule to the specific case 
before the Court, on the grounds that the justification for such limited 
retroactivity-encouraging litigants to challenge outmoded doctrines-was 
outweighed by the unevenness in treatment of similarly situated insurers. 31 
notice, the insurance company will be required to prove both that the notice provision was in 
fact breached and that the breach resulted in prejudice to its position.") 
26 See note 15 supra. 
" G.L. c. 179, § 112 (Motor vehicle liability insurer "shall not deny insurance coverage to 
an insured" because of untimely notice "unless the insurance company has been prejudiced 
thereby.'') 
" 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1835-36, 409 N.E.2d at 188, quoting Diaz v. Eli Lilly & Co., 364 
Mass. 153, 167, 302 N.E.2d 555, 564 (1973). 
" 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1836 n.4, 409 N.E.2d at 188 n.4. 
" /d. at 1836, 409 N.E.2d at 188. 
" /d. at 1836 n.4, 409 N.E.2d at 188 n.4. 
One may question whether the concern with uneven treatment is significant in the context of 
liability insurers as defendants. The objection to this form of limited retroactivity rests on the 
unfairness of singling out one out of a class of similarly situated defendants to pay the cost of 
inducing socially desirable challenges to outmoded judicial doctrines. However, of the class of 
pre-Johnson Controls incidents of untimely notice not yet disposed of by settlement, judg-
ment, o~ the statute of limitations, see Pevoski v. Pevoski, 371 Mass. 358, 361, 358 N.E.2d 418 
(1976), the insurer involved in the Johnson Controls litigation may well have been the carrier 
for many other similar incidents to which the Johnson Controls rule would not be applied 
under the sort of limited retroactive application here under consideration. 
The rejection of such limited retroactivity rests on the assumption that the hope of per-
suading the court to overrule with full retroactivity will suffice to induce litigants to bring 
desirable challenges. R.E. KEETON, VENTIJRING TO DO JUSTICE 36 (1969). This rationale, 
however, has the perverse consequence that it is desirable for courts to remain unpredictable as 
to whether new decisions will be applied retroactively. Cf. P. MISHKIN & C. MORRIS, ON LAw 
IN COURTS 311-12 (1965). At the least, the Supreme Judicial Court's rejection of this limited 
retroactivity technique should lead the Court to be rather reluctant to limit decisions to purely 
prospective effect absent a compelling justification for so doing. 
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The question whether a judicial decision effecting a significant change in 
the law should be given retroactive or prospective effect is a notoriously dif-
ficult one. 32 The ordinary function of judicial adjudication-arbitration of 
disputes among parties concerning events which have already oc-
curred-suggests that retroactivity is the usual course. 33 Although at one 
time it may have been thought that prospective judicial decisions were un-
justifiable on the theory that in overruling prior decisions the courts "do 
not pretend to make a new law, but to vindicate the old one from 
misrepresentation,'' 34 this Blackstonian declaratory view has largely passed 
out of fashion and the legitimacy of prospective overruling is widely con-
ceded. The appropriate conditions for prospective overruling, and even the 
meaning of prospectivity or retroactivity, however, remain problematic. 
Although the Johnson Controls opinion does not discuss the retroactivity 
issue at length, the Court has previously stated the factors relevant to the 
issue of retroactivity in customary terms: "(1) whether a new principle has 
been established whose resolution was not clearly foreshadowed, (2) 
whether retroactive application will further the rule, and (3) whether in-
equitable results, injustice or hardships will be avoided by a holding of 
nonretroactivity. " 35 Brief consideration of the first two factors suggests 
that in Johnson Controls, the key to the retroactivity issue should be the 
third factor-justifiable reliance. Given that the Massachusetts Court does 
not appear to have suggested previously that the traditional approach to 
problems of delayed notice was a likely candidate for reconsideration, it is 
difficult to suggest that the Johnson Controls decision was "clearly 
foreshadowed." On the other hand, it may be argued that judicial 
developments in other jurisdictions should have alerted insurers to the 
possibility of a change in the Massachusetts rule. 36 In any event, the issue of 
" See generally R.E. KEETON, supra note 31, at 39-53; P. MISHKIN & C. MORRIS, supra note 
31, at 293-317; Currier, Time and Change in Judge-Made Law: Prospective Overruling, S 1 VA. 
L. REv. 201 (1965); Mishkin, The Supreme Court, 1964 Term -Foreword: The High Court, 
The Great Writ, and the Due Process of Time and Law, 79 HARv. L. REV. 56 (1965); Note, 
Prospective Overruling and Retroactive Application in the Federal Courts, 71 YALE L.J. 907 
(1962). 
33 P. MISHKIN & C. MORRIS, supra note 31, at 60. 
,. W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *70. 
" Mcintire v. Associates Financial Serv. Co., 367 Mass. 708, 712, 328 N.E.2d 492, 495 
(1979) (citing Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 106-07 (1971)). 
36 The Massachusetts Legislature's abrogation of the traditional approach to delayed notice 
in the context of motor vehicle liability insurance, see note 15 supra, might be thought relevant 
on the issue whether the Johnson Controls ruling was foreshadowed, in the sense that the 
legislative action indicates dissatisfaction with the traditional approach. The argument, 
however, is problematic on the facts presented in Johnson Controls, since the insurer there 
disclaimed coverage in 1974 while the amendment concerning motor vehicle insurance was not 
enacted until1977. On the other hand, to the extent that the Johnson Controls Court's ruling 
on retroactivity responds to the reliance interests of insurers and, to the extent that the Johnson 
Controls Court's ruling on retroactivity responds to the reliance interests of insurers generally, 
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forseability bears on whether reliance was justifiable, and thus does not 
arise until it is determined that insurers have in fact relied on the pre-
Johnson Controls rule. Consideration of whether "retroactive application 
will further the rule" enunciated in Johnson Controls clearly militates in 
favor of retroactivity. The policy of avoiding forfeitures of insurance 
coverage where the insurer has sustained no prejudice from untimely notice 
is no less weighty with respect to occurrences before the decision than after 
the decision. 
In analyzing the issue of justifiable reliance, it is useful to distinguish two 
senses in which insurers might be said to have relied on the pre-Johnson 
Controls rule: First, insurers may have relied in the sense that they an-
ticipated being able to avoid the cost of providing coverage to insureds who 
gave untimely notice. Second, insurers may have relied in the sense that they 
did not, at the time of receiving notice, make any investigation to determine 
whether the delay may have prejudiced their interests. These two senses of 
reliance should be considered seperately, for they have very different conse-
quences. 
Viewing reliance in the sense of the insurer's expectations of being per-
mitted to disclaim coverage, it should be noted that the mere fact that 
retroactive application would increase the insurer's liability cannot be 
dispositive. The Court has frequently given retroactive effect to newly enun-
ciated rules in just such circumstances. 37 Rather, the question must be 
whether the assumption that the insurer would be permitted to disclaim 
coverage on the grounds of untimely notice has led it to take action or make 
commitments which cannot easily be undone. Whether the insurer could 
make a plausible claim of such detrimental reliance is uncertain. 
Notwithstanding the Johnson Controls Court's rather facile assertion 
that in matters of contract law "reliance interests exert a strong 
influence,"38 it seems clear that all matters of contract law do not implicate 
reliance interests to the same extent. In the present case, the extent of in-
surer's reliance on the prior Massachusetts rule would seem to depend 
primarily on the actuarial and accounting practices of liability insurers. 39 
the argument may have force. 
" E.g., Bousquet v. Commonwealth, 374 Mass. 824, 372 N .E.2d 257 (1977) (retroactive ap-
plication of abrogation of sovereign immunity for maintenance of private nuisance); King v. G 
& M Realty Corp., 373 Mass. 658, 370 N.E.2d 413 (1977) (retroactive application of abroga-
tion of rule of diminished responsibility of landlord to tenant concerning condition of common 
areas); Pevoski v. Pevoski, 371 Mass. 358, 358 N.E.2d 416 (1976) (retroactive application of 
abolition of interspousal tort immunity); Diaz v. Eli Lilly & Co., 364 Mass. 153, 302 N.E.2d 
555 (1973) (retroactive application of abrogation of doctrine that wife cannot recover for loss 
of consortium). 
" 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1836 n.4, 409 N.E.2d at 188 n.4. 
" The issue of detrimental reliance might be considered to be mooted altogether if the in-
surer could pass on the increased losses resulting from retroactive application of Johnson Con-
fro/sin the form of higher premiums, for it would surely be a bizarre extension of reliance con-
27
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Presumably, premiums for liability insurance for a given time period are 
computed on the basis of an actuarial prediction of the anticipated losses 
which will have to be paid for occurrences during that period. It seems 
unlikely that insurers explicitly consider the rules of particular jurisdictions 
concerning untimely notice in making the actuarial computations upon 
which premium structures are designed. Rather, it seems likely that predic-
tions of anticipated losses are based principally on loss experience for prior 
periods. 
It might be argued that the pre-Johnson Controls approach to untimely 
notice kept the insurer's loss experience lower than it would have been had 
the new rule been applicable in the past, and thus the insurer could claim 
that it had relied on the prior law in computing premiums. One may well 
wonder, however, about the magnitude of such an effect. The insurer's loss 
experience is, of course, a product of innumerable factors, from the 
accident-proneness of its insureds to the unpredictable decisions of juries on 
damages for pain and suffering. Any change in the law which might alter an 
insurer's liability-including not only changes in the interpretation of in-
surance contracts, but also any changes in the law affecting the liability of 
its insureds-might have an effect on an insurer's loss experience, yet it is 
difficult to believe that prospectivity is to become the rule in judicial deci-
sionmaking rather than the exception. Indeed, if the Court is genuinely will-
ing to credit the insurer's generalized reliance argument, then all of the 
Courts prior decisions40 giving retroactive effect to changes in tort law 
which can be anticipated to increase the liability of defendants likely to 
carry insurance were wrongly decided. 41 
Furthermore, in assessing the insurer's claim that it has, in effect, relied 
on the pre-Johnson Controls rule in making its actuarial computations, it 
would be relevant to inquire whether the insurer's loss predictions have been 
computed separately for each jurisdiction. If the insurer's rate calculations 
are based on nationwide loss experience, the judicial developments in 
jurisdiction other than Massachusetts become relevant. If, as the Johnson 
Controls Court noted, there is "a recent trend" toward the abrogation of 
the traditional approach, 42 the effects of this trend should appear in the 
general loss experience of the multi-state carrier. The all-knowing actuary, 
cepts to suggest that premium payers have relied on the expectation that premiums would be 
reduced by the failure of other insureds promptly to report their losses. It seems likely, 
however, that at least in the case of regulated insurance lines, regulatory agencies generally 
would prohibit an insurer from recouping excessive losses for prior periods by increasing cur-
rent premiums, but see R.E. KEETON, supra note 31, at 37, and thus the insurer's increased 
liability would reduce earnings. In the case of mutual insurance companies, however, the iden-
tity of owners and policy holders would render the reliance argument extremely weak. 
•• See cases cited in note.37 supra. 
41 See R.E. KEETON, supra note 31, at 42-43. 
41 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1833, 409 N.E.2d at 187. 
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seeing the resultant trend of increases in loss experience, would project in-
creases in the necessary premiums. 43 Thus, changes in the law of other 
jurisdictions would "foreshadow" further such changes, diminishing the 
strength of the reliance argument. 
Thus, if the reliance argument is taken to mean simply that the insurer 
has relied on the expectation that its liability would be limited by the pre-
Johnson Controls rule, the existence and extent of insurer's reliance is open 
to question. Some more substantial basis for crediting the insurer's reliance 
argument should be required if the plaintiff in cases such as Johnson Con-
trols is to be deprived of the benefit of the newly announced rule. 
Aside from the generalized reliance argument considered above, the in-
surer might claim that it has relied on the pre-Johnson Controls rule in a 
more specific sense. The insurer might contend that, relying on the pre-
Johnson Controls rule, it did not, at the time it received notice, undertake 
any investigation to determine whether the delay in notification may have 
prejudiced its interests. It may be far more difficult for the insurer to ad-
duce evidence bearing on the issue of prejudice many years after the fact 
than it would have been at the time the insurer received notice. 
For example, suppose that a witness whose testimony might have been 
significant to the defense of the underlying suit cannot now be located. If 
Johnson Controls were given full retroactive effect, for the insurer to satisfy 
its burden of proof it would be required to show not only that the witness is 
now unavailable, but that he or she could not have been located in 1974. 
Thus the insurer may well have a legitimate claim of reliance on the pre-
Johnson Controls rule in the sense that having assumed that prejudice was 
irrelevant, it forwent the opportunity to develop evidence relevant to the 
issue of prejudice. 44 Consideration of reliance in this sense, however, does 
not compel the limitation of the Johnson Controls result to purely prospec-
tive application. 
In response to the insurer's legitimate reliance interests, the Court might 
" The extent to which this argument seems fanciful merely illustrates the doubt that one 
feels about the proposition that the rules of particular jurisdictions on delayed notice actually 
have a determinable effect on insurance premium calculations. 
" Operating under the rule that prejudice must be demonstrated, the insurer must first 
assess whether. the delay may have been prejudicial, and then decide whether to disclaim 
coverage and whether to assume the defense of the action. If the insurer is willing to assume the 
expense of litigation, it can defend the suit under a nonwaiver agreement or reservation of 
rights to preserve its right to disclaim coverage if the defense is unsuccessful. See Salonen v. 
Paanenen, 320 Mass. 568, 71 N.E.2d 227 (1947). The insurer might also bring a declaratory 
judgment action to litigate the issue whether it may disclaim coverage on the basis of prejudice 
alleged to have resulted from delayed notice. See St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Petzold, 
418 F.2d 303 (1st Cir. 1969). Alternatively, the insurer might simply refuse to defend or pro-
vide coverage, taking the risk that it will be unable to establish prejudice if the insured, or the 
insured's claimant, brings suit to establish the insurer's liability under the policy. See Miller v. 
Lindgate Developers, Inc., 274 F. Supp. 980 (E.D. Mo. 1967). 
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have considered a limited form of retroactive application of the new rule, 
whereby the insurer would be relieved of liability if it could prove that its in-
terests would be prejudiced on the hypothetical assumption that it were now 
required to investigate and defend the 1973 occurrence. Thus, the Johnson 
Controls rule could be applied as if the date of the decision were the date on 
which the insurer first received notice. In effect, this approach would make 
the issue of the insurer's detrimental reliance on the pre-Johnson Controls 
rule a matter for proof in each specific case, where detrimental reliance is 
taken not in the sense that the insurer relied on the old rule in expecting to 
avoid coverage, but in the sense that the insurer relied on the old rule in not 
investigating the occurrence at the time it was reported to determine 
whether the delayed notice may have prejudiced its interests. 45 
The Court is to be commended for its abrogation of the traditional inflex-
ible approach to problems of delayed notice of occurrences covered by 
liability insurance. It is, however, unfortunate that the Court did not engage 
in a more detailed analysis of the problems of prospective or retroactive ap-
plication of the newly announced rule. It is unsettling to see the Court ap-
plying in the case before it a rule which it has found to be unjust, on the 
basis of nothing more than a perfum;tory analysis of the retroactivity 
issue. 46 One does not envy the attorney for Johnson Controls faced with his 
client's question whether they won the lawsuit. 
., Other possible approaches are suggested by the decision of the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court in Brakeman v. Potomac Ins. Co., 472 Pa. 66, 371 A.2d 193 (1977). There the insurer 
disclaimed coverage on the grounds of untimely notice am;! the insured settled the claim. The 
Pennsylvania court overruled prior decisions and held that the insurer could escape liability on-
ly if it was prejudiced by the untimely notice. The Brakeman court remanded the case with in-
structions that the insurer be given an opportunity to show prejudice from the delay in notifica-
tion and an opportunity to litigate the issues of the insured's liability to the claimant./d. at 77, 
371 A.2d at 198. A concurring and dissenting opinion suggested that the insured should be per-
mitted to litigate the issue of prejudice and the issue of whether tlie settlement was made in 
good faith, but not the issue of the insured's liability./d. at 87, 371 A.2d at 200 (Roberts, J., 
concurring and dissenting). Affording the Insurer some opportunity to litigate the issue of the 
insured's liability responds to the problem suggested above that the insurer may have relied on 
the prior law in foregoing the opportunity to assume control of the defense of the action at the 
time the delayed notice was given. See id. at 77-78, 371 A.2d at 198-99. 
It appears, however, that the Brakeman approach has not been consistently applied in Penn-
sylvania. In August v. Stask, 253 Pa. Super. 310, 384 A.2d 1259 (1978), two judges of the 
Pennsylvania Superior Court dissented from the court's per curiam order without opinion. The 
dissent's one sentence opinion states "the rule of Brakeman ... should be applied, as it was 
applied in Brakeman, to all cases pending on appeal." 
•• The likelihood that full analysis of retroactivity issues may present complex factual issues 
raises procedural questions. For the plaintiff in Johnson Controls to have won his case he 
needed to establish both that the prior Massachusetts law should be overruled and that the new 
rule should be applied retroactively. Considerations of judicial economy and concern for the 
parties' expenses may suggest that decision on retroactivity be postponed until after decision 
on the merits, and that the parties be given an opportunity to develop a factual record on the 
issues bearing on retroactivity: 
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§ 3.4. Construction Contracts - Unpaid Subcontractors Right to 
Recover from Owner- Unjust Enrichment. The problem of sorting out 
the rights of owners, contractors, subcontractors, financiers, sureties, and 
others upon the default of a construction contractor has troubled the courts 
for nearly a century! During the Survey year the Supreme Judicial Court 
was confronted with a rather unusual variation of these problems in 
Superior Glass Co. v. First Bristol County National Bank. 2 Although the 
factual situation involved in Superior Glass was considerably simpler than 
often confronts the courts, the resolution of the problem seems no less dif-
ficult. 
The defendant bank awarded a contract to Thomson Construction Co. 
for the construction of a branch bank building.~ At the time, Thomson was 
indebted to the bank on various unrelated unsecured loans. 4 Although the 
construction contract called for Thomson to procure performance and pay-
ment bonds, Thomson proved to be unbondable because of its financial 
condition. s The bank waived the bond requirement. 6 Plaintiffs, subcontrac-
tors engaged by Thomson, were shown copies of the contract between 
Thomson and the bank, read the provision requiring a payment bond, and 
claimed to have relied upon it. 7 The bank did not inform the subcontractors 
that a bond had not been supplied, nor did the subcontractors make any in-
quiries on the subject until after they had completed work. 8 Apparently, the 
bank's architect requested, and perhaps received, releases of liens from the 
subcontractors as a condition of making progress payments to the general 
contractor. 9 In any event, neither of the plaintiffs took any action to perfect 
liens for labor and materials. 10 Upon completion ofthe job, the bank issued 
to Thomson a check for the balance due on the contract. Thomson im-
mediately endorsed the check to the bank, which then applied most of the 
amount of the check to unrelated debts due from Thomson to the bank. 11 
At that time the bank knew of Thomson's financial difficulties and knew 
that Thomson had not paid amounts owed to various subcontractors, in-
cluding plaintiffs. 12 
§ 3.4 1 See generally, II G. GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY 
§§ 36.1-36.8 (1965); Speidel, "Stakeholder" Payments Under Federal Construction Contracts: 
Payment Bond Surety vs. Assignee, 47 VA. L. REv. 640 (1961). 
' 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1419, 406 N.E.2d 672. 
' /d. at 1420, 406 N.E.2d at 673 . 
• /d. 
' /d. 
6 /d. 
7 /d. 
' /d. 
• /d. at 1421, 406 N.E.2d at 673. 
" See G.L. c. 254, § 4. 
11 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1420, 406 N.E.2d at 673. 
12 /d. 
31
Rogers: Chapter 3: Contracts and Commercial Law
Published by Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School, 1980
100 1980 ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETTS LAW §3.4 
Plaintiffs sued the bank for the amounts due them from the general con-
tractor, contending that the bank was liable in contract, tort, and equity. 13 
Judgment for the plaintiffs was affirmed by the Appeals Court, on the 
theory that in the particular circumstances the bank, as owner, owed a 
fiduciary duty to the subcontractors. 14 In an opinion by Justice Braucher, 
the Supreme Judicial Court rejected the Appeal Court's fiduciary duty 
theory, 15 but affirmed the judgment for plaintiffs on an unjust enrichment 
theory. 16 
As had the Appeals Court, Justice Braucher rejected plaintiffs' contract 
argument. 17 The contract between the bank and Thomson expressly 
disclaimed the existence of any contractual relationship between the owner 
and the subcontractors. 18 Prior case law established that a provision in a 
construction contract calling for the general contractor to provide a bond 
does not give rise to any contractual obligation of the owner to the subcon-
tractors to see that the bond is provided. 19 The Court also affirmed the Ap-
peals Court's ruling that the bank had made no express or implied represen-
tations on which plaintiffs could rely that a bond had been furnished. 2° Fur-
thermore, the Court agreed with the Appeals Court that liability could not 
be imposed on the bank "solely on the basis of its requests for waivers of 
lien. " 21 
Plaintiffs' argument that the bank had violated fiduciary duties owed to 
the subcontractors was dismissed by the Court. 22 The relationship between 
the bank and the subcontractors was an arm's-length business relationship, 
and could not be transformed into a fiduciary one by the plaintiffs 
" 'reposing trust and confidence in the defendant.' " 23 Thus, the bank, 
either as lender or as owner, had no fiduciary obligations to see that the 
general contractor applied money received from the bank to obligations due 
to subcontractors. 24 
The Court then considered whether plaintiffs could recover on an unjust 
enrichment theory. In holding that the plaintiffs could recover on this 
theory, the Court relied upon the often cited passage in the United States 
13 /d. at 1421, 406 N.E.2d at 674. 
14 /d. at 1419-20, 416 N.E.2d at 673. The Appeals Court decision is reported at 1979 Mass. 
App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 1844, 394 N.E.2d 1972. 
1
' 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1419-20, 406 N.E.2d at 673. 
16 Id. at 1423-24, 406 N.E.2d at 675. 
1
' /d. at 1421-22, 406 N.E.2d at 674. 
11 Id. at 1421, 406 N.E.2d at 674. 
19 Morse Bros. Elec. Co. v. Martin Shore Realty, 344 Mass. 81, 181 N.E.2d 549 (1962). 
20 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1421-22, 406 N.E.2d at 674. 
21 Id. at 1422, 406 N.E.2d at 674. 
22 /d. 
" /d. (quoting Broomfield v. Kosow, 349 Mass. 749, 755, 212 N.E.2d 556, 560 (1965)). 
'' 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1422, 406 N.E.2d at 674. 
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Supreme Court's opinion in United States v. Munsey Trust Co., 25 recogniz-
ing "the peculiarly equitable claim of those responsible for the physical 
completion of building contracts to be paid from available money ahead of 
others whose claims come from the advance of money." 26 It noted that 
under Massachusetts law a surety who pays subcontractors has a claim to 
funds retained by the owner prior to the claim of a bank which lent money 
to the contractor on the security of the contractor's accounts receivable. 27 
That the bank in this case combined the roles of owner and financier should 
not, the Court stated, diminish its equitable obligations. 28 The Court then 
noted that by its various actions the bank ''lulled the subcontractors into 
assuming that their creditor positions were protected''; that it received the 
benefit of their work with knowledge of the likelihood that they would not 
be paid by the general contractor; and that it "gave itself a preference as a 
creditor out of the final payment to the contractor. " 29 In these cir-
cumstances, the Court ruled that the amount which the bank received from 
the final contract payment and applied to other debts due from the contrac-
tor was "subject to the peculiarly equitable claims of the subcontractor 
plaintiffs, enforceable by way of 'constructive trust.' " 30 Thus, the 
judgments for plaintiffs were affirmed. 31 
The Court's reasoning concerning the unjust enrichment theory is not 
easily unraveled. It should be noted that subcontractors have generally had 
little success in attempting to recover from owners on an unjust enrichment 
theory. 32 The Court's conclusion that such recovery was appropriate in 
Superior Glass appears to have been based on two factors. First, there is the 
notion that the subcontractors had "peculiarly equitable claims" to receive 
payment from funds due from the owner to the contractor. Second, it seems 
to have been significant that the bank used the final payment due to the con-
tractor to satisfy other debts of the contractor to the bank. 
The concept that subcontractors have an equitable claim to funds due 
from the owner under the contract with the general contractor derives from 
cases involving priority conflicts between sureties and financiers of general 
contractors. In the usual case, the contractor's surety, having paid subcon-
tractors upon the contractor's default, seeks priority in payment out of 
funds owed by the owner to the contractor over a bank or other financier 
" 332 u.s. 234 (1947). 
" 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1423, 406 N.E.2d at 674, quoting United States v. Munsey Trust 
Co., 332 U.S. 234, 240 (1947). 
" 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1423,406 N.E.2d at 675, citing Canter v. Schlager, 358 Mass. 789, 
267 N.E.2d 492 (1971). 
" 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1423, 406 N.E.2d at 675. 
" /d. 
30 /d. at 1423-24, 406 N.E.2d at 675. 
" /d. at 1424, 406 N.E.2d at 675. 
32 II G.E. PALMER, THE LAW OF RESTITUTION§ 10.7, at 423-24 (1978). 
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which has lent money to the contractor secured by an assignment ofthe con-
tractor's right to payment from the owner. 33 Much of the law in this area 
has evolved in cases concerning federal government construction contracts. 
A line of Supreme Court cases beginning with Prairie State Bank v. United 
States34 and Henningsen v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 35 
establishes that, at least with respect to amounts admittedly due from the 
United States as owner which the United States holds merely as stakeholder, 
the surety's claim has priority over that of the assignee. The cases are based 
on a subrogation theory - specifically, that a surety is subrogated to the 
rights not only of the subcontractors which it has paid, but also to the rights 
of the United States as owner. 36 The assignee, of course, derives its rights 
only from the contractor. Thus, the surety will prevail over the assignee if 
the owner has the right to pay funds due under the construction contract to 
the subcontractors rather than to the general contractor. In private con-
struction contracts, it seems sensible to conclude that the owner may pay 
amounts due under the contract to the subcontractors rather than the 
general contractor. Since the subcontractors may have the benefit of 
mechanics' and materialmen's liens enforceable against the owner's proper-
ty, payment to the subcontractors not only benefits the general contractor 
by discharging its obligations, but also protects the owner by discharging 
the mechanics' and materialmen's liens. 37 The case of government construc-
tion contracts, however, is more complicated since subcontractors do not 
have the right to obtain mechanics' and materialmen's liens on federal 
property. 38 Nonetheless, the cases have recognized that the United States 
has the right to make payment to the subcontractors rather than the general 
contractor on the theory that the United States has at least a moral or 
equitable obligation to see that the subcontractors are paid. 39 
" See generally II G. GILMORE, supra note I; Speidel, supra note 1. 
.. 164 u.s. 227 (1896). 
" 208 u.s. 404 (1908). 
•• E.g., Prairie State National Bank v. United States, 164 U.S. 227, 231-34 (1896); Hen-
ningsen v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 208 U.S. 404, 410-12 (1908); Framingham 
Trust Co. v. Gould-National Batteries, Inc., 427 F.2d 856 (1st Cir. 1970); National Shawmut 
Bank v. New Amsterdam Cas. Co., 411 F.2d 843, 844-45 (1st Cir. 1969). 
" In fact, however, the law seems to have developed first in the area of federal contracts. 
Cases involving private contracts seem to rest primarily on the "equitable obligation" theory 
developed in government contract cases, without recognition that the surety's subrogation 
theory is even stronger in private contracts. See Framingham Trust Co. v. Gould-National Bat-
teries, Inc., 427 F.2d 856 (1st Cir. 1970). 
" United States v. Ansonia Brass & Copper Co., 218 U.S. 452 (1910); United States v. 
Munsey Trust Co., 332 U.S. 234, 241 (1947). 
" United States v. Munsey Trust Co., 332 U.S. 234, 240 (1947); National Surety Corp. v. 
United States, 133 F. Supp. 381 (Ct. Cl.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 902 (1955); Speidel, supra note 
1 at 646. The precise nature of the subcontractor's claim has never been made clear. See Bank 
of Ariz. v. National Sur. Corp., 237 F.2d 90, 93 (9th Cir. 1956). Massachusetts case law 
34
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It is important to note that this moral or equitable obligation of the 
owner to the subcontractors, and the subcontractors' corresponding 
"peculiarly equitable claims," appear in the surety-assignee cases as a 
predicate to the conclusion that the owner has a right to pay subcontractors 
in preference to the general contractor. The surety-assignee cases cannot be 
read as holding that the owner has a duty, enforceable by the subcontractor, 
to pay subcontractors for work performed by them. Indeed, in United 
States v. Munsey Trust Co., 40 the Supreme Court rejected any such claim by 
the subcontractors. 41 In Munsey Trust the contractor completed the con-
struction job leaving subcontractors unpaid, and the surety, who paid the 
subcontractors' claims under a payment bond, brought suit against the 
United States seeking to recover the retained amounts due under the con-
tract. 42 The United States had set off the retained percentages against an 
unrelated debt of the contractor to the United States. 43 The Supreme Court 
distinguished the surety-assignee cases on the grounds that in such cases the 
United States as owner made no claim to the retained percentages, but held 
them as a mere stakeholder. 44 Whatever the nature of the subcontractors' 
"equitable claims" to receive payment from funds due to the contractor, 
Munsey Trust clearly indicates that the subcontractors' claims do not 
preclude the owner from asserting its own claim to funds otherwise due the 
contractor. 45 As Justice Jackson stated, "nothing is more clear than that 
laborers and materialmen do not have enforceable rights against the United 
States. " 46 
Thus, the Superior Glass Court's reliance on the surety-assignee cases and 
the subcontractors' "peculiarly equitable claims" seems misplaced. The 
surety prevails over the assignee not because it is subrogated to rights of 
subcontractors enforceable against the owner, but because it is subrogated 
to the rights of the owner against the contractor, and hence against the con-
tractor's assignee. In Superior Glass, however, it is the rights of the subcon-
tractor against the owner which must be determined. As Munsey Trust in-
dicates, the subcontractors' "peculiarly equitable claims" are of little 
significance in this setting. 47 
establishes only that the subcontractor's right does not rise to the status of an equitable lien. 
Ehrlich v. Johnson Service Co., 272 Mass. 385, 172 N.E. 508 (1930). 
40 332 u.s. 234 (1947). 
4
' Id. at 241. 
42 ld. at 236-38 . 
., ld. at 240. 
44 Id . 
., ld. 
46 Id. at 241. 
47 The existence of statutory provision for mechanics' and materialmen's liens can be taken 
as some indication of a public policy that owners are obliged to see to the payment of subcon-
tractors. Thus, it is difficult to argue that the equities lie strongly with the owner who obtains 
the benefit of the work of unpaid subcontractors. The owner, of course, has not obtained the 
35
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Although it has never been entirely clear whether the Supreme Court 
cases such as Munsey Trust are applying federal or state law, 48 such deci-
sions are not, of course, binding on state courts applying state law. Thus, 
while Munsey Trust seems to be on all fours with Superior Glass, the 
Supreme Judicial Court might take the position that the owner should not 
be permitted to set off other claims against amounts due to the owner under 
the contract, at least where it is apparent that so doing will make it unlikely 
that the subcontractors will be paid. Some of the language of the Superior 
Glass oJ)inion, and, indeed, the remedy adopted by the Court - imposition 
of a constructive trust on the funds which the bank received back from the 
contractor and applied to unrelated debts - may suggest that the bank's 
receipt of this preference was the determinative factor. 49 That view is not 
entirely without appeal. To the extent that the contractor's inability to pay 
subcontractors can be viewed as a result of the owner's application of 
payments due under the contract to other debts of the contractor to the 
owner, it may seem unjust for the owner to retain the benefits of the sub-
contractors' work and remit the subcontractor to its action against the con-
tractor. Yet acceptance of such an application of the unjust enrichment 
principle would come very close to rejecting the well-established principle 
that receipt of a preference is not wrongful.so The proposition that a 
creditor who receives a preferential payment has been unjustly enriched, at 
least if the funds used by the debtor in paying the preferred creditor are in 
some sense the product of other creditors' advances of goods, services, or 
funds, would have far-reaching consequences. Thus, a bank which sets off a 
debtor's deposited funds against the debtor's obligations to the bank could 
be required to disgorge the setoff at the suit of the unpaid trade creditors 
whose advances of supplies enabled the debtor to generate the funds on 
deposit. It seems inconceivable that the Court would extend unjust enrich-
ment principles to that extent. 
benefit of the work without payment - he has or is obliged to pay the contractor. Yet the lien 
statutes effectively impose on the owner the obligation of seeing. that the contractor pays the 
subcontractors. In Superior Glass, however, the subcontractors did not avail themselves of the 
protection of the lien statutes. Elevating the amorphous "peculiarly equitable claims" of the 
subcontractor to the level of claims against the owner enforceable by subcontractors who have 
not filed liens would countenance an "end run" around the procedural requirements of the lien 
statutes. 
" See II G. GILMORE, supra note 1, § 361 at 949 . 
., In Superior Glass the amount owed to the plaintiff subcontractors was less than the 
amount applied by the bank to other debts due it from the contractor. 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 
1420, 406 N.E.2d at 673. It is unclear from the opinion what the Court would have done had 
the plaintiffs' claims exceeded the amount of the preferential payment to the bank. The 
Court's emphasis on the bank's receipt of a preference, and the use of the constructive trust 
remedy, may suggest that the subcontractors' recovery from the owner would be limited to the 
amount of the preferential payment. 
•• See, e.g., Banco Italiana di Sconto v. Bailey, 260 Mass. 151, 157 N.E. 40 (1927). 
36
Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law, Vol. 1980 [1980], Art. 6
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/asml/vol1980/iss1/6
§3.4 CONTRACTS AND COMMERCIAL LAW 105 
Moreover, the Superior Glass Court's emphasis on the bank's receipt of a 
preferential payment ignores the fact that the effect of the Court's ruling 
was to give the subcontractors a preference over other creditors of the 
general contractor. The general contractor's right to receive payment from 
the bank on the construction contract is an asset of the general contractor to 
which all of its creditors have legitimate claims. To be sure, if the bank is 
permitted to set off its obligations to the general contractor against 
unrelated claims of the bank against the contractor, the bank has received a 
preference over the other creditors of the general contractor, including the 
plaintiff subcontractors. Yet, if the subcontractors are permitted to recover 
from the owner amounts owed to the general contractor, the subcontractors 
are given a preference over other creditors, including the bank. Curiously, 
the situation involved in Superior Glass is one where support can be found 
for both forms of preference. The right of setoff against an insolvent is a 
well recognized ground for preference, even in proceedings under the 
federal bankruptcy act. 51 On the other hand, the premise of the surety-
assignee cases - that the owner has the right to pay amounts due under the 
contract to the subcontractors rather than the general contractor- is, in ef-
fect, a recognition that it is not inappropriate for the subcontractors to be 
given a preferential payment over other creditors of the general contractor. 
Accordingly, the unjust enrichment concept in itself appears to provide lit-
tle basis for choosing between these two recognized bases for preferential 
payments. 
Thus, if only by process of elimination, it seems that the Superior Glass 
holding must rest principally on something akin to a misrepresentation 
theory. The bank's actions were hardly calculated to apprise the subcon-
tractors of the risks they faced or their need to take steps to protect 
themselves. Having circulated a contract containing a provision requiring 
payment and performance bonds, the bank surely should have realized that 
its decision to waive the bonding requirement was a matter of some 
significance to the subcontractors. Of course, the payment bond may be 
viewed as primarily a mechanism for protecting the owner from the imposi-
tion of mechanics' and materialmen's liens. Thus, waiver of the bond re-
quirement, in itself, might not be seen as wrongful toward the subcontrac-
tors since they can protect themselves by filing liens against the property 
pursuant to chapter 254, section 4 of the General Laws. In Superior Glass, 
however, the bank's actions seem to have been designed to dissuade the sub-
contractors from filing liens. Apparently the bank required the contractor 
to obtain waivers of liens from the subcontractors before progress payments 
were made to the contractor. As the Court suggested, a theory basing the 
bank's liability on the requests for lien waivers is somewhat problematic in 
" 11 u.s.c. § 553. 
37
Rogers: Chapter 3: Contracts and Commercial Law
Published by Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School, 1980
106 1980 ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETTS LAW §3.4 
view of chapter 254, section 32 of the General Laws, which declares that 
agreements waiving the protection of mechanics' and materialmen's liens 
are unenforceable as contrary to the public policy. 52 The subcontractors, 
however, may have been unaware of this provision and may have been 
dissuaded from filing liens by their agreement to waive this protection. In 
any event, it seems clear that a pure misrepresentation theory on the facts of 
Superior Glass would raise a variety of difficulties, given that the situation 
was one of nondisclosure rather than positive misrepresentation and given 
that the subcontractors could have protected themselves by making in-
quiries concerning a payment bond or filing liens. 53 
Thus, Superior Glass may simply be a case where, faced with a record 
which would not unequivocally support recovery on a misrepresentation 
theory, the Court invoked the pliable concept of unjust enrichment to 
achieve what appeared to the Court to be an equitable result. 
" Moreover, the Court appears to have been presented with a somewhat murky record con-
cerning the lien waiver requests. The waivers were not in the record, and the trial judge made 
no findings on the matter. 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1422, 406 N.E.2d at 674. 
" See generally W.L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS§ 106 (4th ed. 1971). 
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§ 3.5. Arbitrability of Dispute Concerning Fraudulent Inducement. In 
Quirk v. Data Terminal Systems, Inc. 1 the Supreme Judicial Court con-
sidered whether parties must arbitrate claims of fraud in the inducement 
when the contract calls for arbitration of any dispute "arising out of, or 
relating to" the contract. 2 In confronting this issue for the first time the 
Court held that a claim of fraudulent inducement of the contract as a 
whole, as distinguished from a claim of fraudulent inducement of the 
specific arbitration clause, should be resolved through arbitration. 3 
Plaintiff entered into a contract providing that it would convey land to 
defendant and construct a building thereon. 4 Upon timely completion of the 
construction, plaintiff was to have the option of repurchasing the property. 5 
The agreement provided that "[a]ll claims, disputes and other matters in 
question arising out of, or relating to, this Contract or the breach thereof," 
with certain exceptions not here relevant, were to be decided by arbitration. 6 
A dispute arose and plaintiff commenced arbitration proceedings. 7 Plaintiff 
then filed suit contending that it was induced by fraud to enter into the con-
tract and that it had not learned of the facts on which this claim was based 
until after it had initiated arbitration proceedings. 8 Defendant's motion to 
compel arbitration and stay court proceedings was denied by the superior 
court. 9 A single justice of the Appeals Court reversed and the case was 
transferred to the Supreme Judicial Court on the Court's own motion for 
direct appellate review. 10 
The Court first ruled that the language of the arbitration provision 
''clearly encompasses a claim of fraud in the inducement of the contract. '' 11 
The plaintiff, however, contended tha:t the Massachusetts arbitration 
statute, chapter 251, precluded arbitration of this dispute. 12 Section 1 of 
chapter 251 provides that "a provision in a written contract to submit to ar-
bitration any controversy thereafter arising between the parties shall be 
valid, enforceable and irrevocable, save upon such grounds as exist at law 
or in equity for revocation of any contract." 13 
Chief Justice Hennessey's opinion for the Court noted that there is a con-
§ 3.5 ' 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. 387, 400 N.E.2d 858. 
2 /d. 
'/d. 
• /d. at 389, 400 N.E.2d at 860. 
' /d. 
' !d. at 389 & n.1, 400 N.E.2d at 860 & n.l. 
' /d. at 388, 400 N.E.2d at 859. 
I fd. 
• /d. 
'
0 /d. at 387-89, 400 N.E.2d at 859-60. 
" /d. at 390, 400 N.E.2d at 860. 
" !d. at 391, 400 N.E.2d at 861. 
" G.L. c. 251, § 1. 
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flict in the decisions of other jurisdictions having similar arbitration statutes 
on the arbitrability of claims of fraudulent inducement. 14 Decisions in a few 
jurisdictions have held that such statutory language precludes arbitration of 
fraudulent inducement claims. 1' In many other jurisdictions, however, it 
has been held that absent a claim that the arbitration provision itself was in-
duced by fraud, such claims should be resolved by arbitration. 16 The Court 
concluded that the latter view is the preferable one. 17 
Viewing the issue as whether the parties had actually agreed to arbitrate, 
the Court reasoned that where there was no claim of fraudulent inducement 
of the arbitration provision itself, the policy of the arbitration statute that 
"the arbitration procedure, when selected by the parties to a contract, 
should be speedy and not subject to delay and obstruction in the courts," 
dictates that claims of fraudulent inducement of the contract as a whole 
should be resolved by arbitration. 18 The Court's conclusion seems entirely 
sound, particularly in view of the ease with which virtually any breach of 
contract dispute can be turned into a claim of fraudulent inducements. All a 
party need do to claim fraudulent inducement is allege that at the time the 
contract was signed the other party intended not to perform. 19 To be sure, 
such a claim may ultimately be proved groundless. Nevertheless, recogni-
tion of such claims as nonarbitrable would provide an all too easy method 
for a party to circumvent arbitration. 
" 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 391, 400 N.E.2d at 861. 
" E.g., George Engine Co. v. Southern Shipbuilding Corp., 350 So.2d 881 (La. 1977); At-
cas v. Credit Clearing Corp., 292 Minn. 334, 197 N.W.2d 448 (1972). 
" E.g., Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395 (1967); Two Sisters, 
Inc. v. Gosch & Co., 171 Conn. 493, 370 A.2d 1020 (1976); Security Constr. Co. v. Marietta, 
25 Md. App. 303, 334 A.2d 133 (1975); Information Sciences, Inc. v. Mohawk Data Science 
Corp., 43 N.Y.2d 918, 403 N.Y.S.2d 730, 374 N.E.2d 624 (1978); In re Weinrott v. Carp, 32 
N.Y.2d 190, 344 N.Y.S.2d 848, 298 N.E.2d 42 (1973); Pinkis v. Network Cinema Corp., 9 
Wash. App. 337, 512 P.2d 751 (1973). 
" 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 392-93, 400 N.E.2d at 861-62. 
II Id. 
" This appears to have been the nature of the fraudulent inducement claim in the Quirk 
case. See id. at 390, 400 N.E.2d at 860. 
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§ 3.6 Bank's Liability on Certified Checks. The courts have had con-
siderable difficulty with the question whether a bank may avoid liability on 
a cashier's check, bank check, or certified check 1 under the provisions of 
the Uniform Commercial Code ("Code"). 2 Much of the difficulty stems 
from confusion over the concept of stopping payment on a check. The Mas-
sachusetts Appeals Court was presented with such a question in Travi Con-
struction Corp. v. First Bristol County National Bank. 3 With but a few 
missteps in the course of its analysis, the court arrived at the correct result. 
Lesser issued its personal check, drawn on the defendant bank, to Travi 
Construction Corp. (Travi). 4 Travi took the check to the bank, which issued 
Travi its cashier's check in exchange for Lesser's personal check. Prior to is-
suing the cashier's check, Lesser had delivered an effective stop payment 
order to the bank on his personal check drawn to Travi. 5 When the cashier's 
check was subsequently presented to the defendant bank by Travi's bank, it 
was not honored. 6 Travi then brought suit against the defendant bank on 
the cashier's check. 7 
The Appeals Court indicated that two conflicting lines of authority exist 
on whether a bank can dishonor its cashier's check. 8 Under the first view 
considered by the Court, dishonor is flatly prohibited on the theory that a 
cashier's check is a draft drawn by the bank on itself and is thereby accepted 
in advance by the act of its issuance. 9 This theory is based on section 
4-303(a) of the Code which indicates that a stop-payment order must be 
made prior to acceptance of the instrument. 10 The second view rejects this 
"iron-clad rule," and the bank may dishonor its cashier's check in certain 
situations; primarily if there has been a failure of consideration. Under this 
theory, the bank may assert its own defenses against one who is not a holder 
in due course. 11 
The Appeals Court noted a number of objections to what it described as 
the "flat prohibition" rule, but ultimately rested its holding that a bank 
§ 3.6 ' These are not defined terms under the Uniform Commercial Code, however, their 
meaning is fairly settled in ordinary usage. A cashier's check is a check on which the bank is 
both the drawer and the drawee. A bank check or bank draft is a check drawn by one bank on 
its account with another bank. A certified check is a check drawn by an individual on its ac-
count with a bank which the bank has accepted. R. BRAUCHER & R. RIEGERT, INTRODUCTION 
TO COMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS 88-94 (1977). 
' G.L. c. 106, §§ 1-101 et seq. 
' 1980 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 1119, 405 N.E.2d 666 . 
• /d. 
'/d . 
• /d. 
7 /d. 
• /d. at 1120, 405 N.E.2d at 667 . 
• /d. 
,. G.L. c. 106, § 4-303(a). 
11 1980 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 1120, 405 N.E.2d at 667. 
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may refuse to honor its cashier's check after a failure of consideration when 
the check is held by a party to the instrument with whom it has dealt, upon 
the grounds that in this limited situation the policy concerns which justify a 
rule against dishonor do not exist. 12 Since the dispute was solely between the 
bank and Travi, and the rights of third parties were not involved, the court 
perceived no reason to prevent the bank from asserting the defense of 
failure of consideration. 13 
Discussion of whether a bank has accepted its own cashier's check or can 
stop payment on its own cashier's check is virtually meaningless. A cashier's 
check is a check on which the bank is both the drawer and the drawee. 14 A 
stop payment order is simply an instruction from the drawer to the drawee 
not to pay the check to the payee. Thus, asking whether a bank can stop 
payment on its own cashier's check is asking whether a bank can tell itself 
not to pay its own check -an issue of little significance. In any event, stop-
ping payment has no effect on the liability of the drawer to the payee. 15 The 
critical issue in this problem is whether the drawer has any defense which it 
can raise against the party seeking payment. Similarly, asking whether a 
bank has accepted its cashier's check is a bit peculiar. Acceptance is simply 
the drawee's engagement to pay16 -the effect of acceptance is that the 
drawee becomes liable on the check under section 3-413 of the Code.•' Since 
the bank is the drawer of a cashier's check it has already undertaken the sec-
tion 3-413 obligations in its role as drawer, and acceptance is irrelevant. 18 
Again, the critical issue is whether the bank, as drawer, has any defense 
available to it. 
Once the distractions of stopping payment and acceptance are put to one 
side, the resolution of the problem presented in Travi is simple. The issue is 
whether the bank, as drawer, can assert the defense of failure of considera-
tion against the payee, Travi. As the Appeals Court ultimately recognized, 19 
the answer to that question is readily provided by the Code. Whether or not 
Travi could claim status as a holder in due course, the defense was open to 
the bank. Under section 3-306 a holder who is not a holder in due course 
" Id. at 1122, 405 N.E.2d at 668. 
" Id. 
•• See note 1, supra. 
" See G.L. c. 106, § 3-413. 
" G.L. c. 106, § 3-410. 
" G.L. c. 106, § 3-413. 
" Which is not to say that banks don't do such silly things. I once asked a major commercial 
bank in Boston to certify my personal check which I was going to use to purchase a car. The 
bank clerk explained that they couldn't do that, but would issue a cashier's check instead and 
would certify that. I decided it was easier to sit back and grin than to try to explain. No doubt 
the dealer from which I purchased the car was pleased to know that by virtue of the certifica-
tion the bank had agreed to pay the check both as drawer and as acceptor. 
19 1980 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 1124, 405 N.E.2d at 669. 
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clearly takes subject to the drawer's defense of failure of consideration. 20 
Similarly, even if Travi were a holder in due course, section 3·305(2) pro· 
vides that a holder in due course takes subject to defenses of any party with 
whom he has dealt. 21 Travi clearly dealt with the bank in obtaining the 
cashier's check. Thus, there was no need to resort to discussions of whether 
"policy considerations" warranted an exception to the "rule against 
dishonor." 22 
" G.L. c. 106, § 3-306. 
" G.L. c. 106, § 3-305(2). 
" Since the bank was seeking only to assert its own defense of failure of consideration, the 
Travi case did not present the more difficult question of whether a bank which has issued a 
bank check or cashier's check at its customer's request or certified its customer's check can 
raise defenses of its customer when sued by a holder of the instrument. See generally B. CLARK 
& A. SQUILLANTE, THE LAW OF BANK DEPOSITS, COLLECfiONS AND CREDIT CARDS 51-56 (1970). 
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